There are times when one does not wish to be vindicated. Anticipating the strengthening of Hamas, I winced when the Administration greeted with unseemly satisfaction the death of Yasir Arafat, which was characterized as a major breakthrough in a campaign for Middle East democratization.
On the eve of the Iraq war, I warned the Administration in an intelligence assessment (leaked by someone to the Los Angeles Times) that the establishment of thoroughgoing and enduring democracies in the Middle East would be a tough slog, for a variety of reasons, even if the Administration’s overly-optimistic goals in Iraq were successfully realized.
I was not alone. Such a conclusion was not difficult to reach: polling from a variety of sources proved beyond a shadow of a doubt some years ago that populations in the Middle East region generally had become more anti-American, more anti-Israeli, more Islamist, and less interested in the Western concept of women’s rights than most governments then in power, despite the other failings of many such governments.
It was fairly easy to surmise that new governments reflecting these attitudes would not be compatible with the Administration’s vision of democracy.
Now, we have the stunning triumph of Hamas, even more dramatic than the largely predictable success of Islamist Shi’a parties in Iraq’s recent elections. The Administration and Israel have again denounced Hamas as a terrorist group and an entity that could not be a partner, as is, in a process of engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian political arena.
We cannot and should not ignore the violent track record of Hamas and its militant charter. But Hamas in power is a reality on the Israeli-Palestinian stage, pure and simple. Efforts to sort out a way to work with Hamas must now be a top priority.
Whether it is Hamas on the Palestinian front or militant Sunni Arabs in Iraq, such powerful forces must, if possible, be drawn into the political mainstream. Exclusion is no longer a realistic option. In the face of this new reality, which stems in part from US efforts to promote democratization in the first place, Washington should lead the way in devising new strategies for engaging those formerly confined to the political fringe.
Many politicians and observers have argued (and will likely continue to do so) that negotiating with such groups is unacceptable because of their violent track records. Yet, all conflicts usually end because two warring parties sit down and talk.
Sometimes that engagement-- as with the conclusion of titanic struggles like the 20th Century’s two world wars-- occurs only because one side has been defeated, finds itself in a hopeless position, and is prepared to “surrender” or accept dictated terms. But beware: such terms often lead to more conflict down the road.
In less conventional and sometimes more prolonged scenarios, it is not surprising that some parties finally recognize the need to talk as relative equals. Yasir Arafat began as a “terrorist,” only to be embraced later as a partner. Others have swallowed hard and taken this route. It is now time for Israel and the international community to begin seriously exploring the possibility of usefully engaging Hamas. Early polling reportedly indicates that there is considerable popular support in Israel for moving in this direction.
Hamas also has obligations. Hamas must recognize that if engagement is to have any real value, it must reassess its past rejectionism. It has to be prepared to cast aside provocative and violent aspects of its program and transform itself into a tough advocate of Palestinian rights, not a source of or inspiration for suicide bombings. Arafat made the serious mistake of launching the second Intifada back in 2000, which devastated Palestinian infrastructure and shattered emerging Israeli-Palestinian trust. Hamas must avoid making the same mistake.
There may be opportunity in all this. The US and Israel cannot afford to wallow in recrimination and pessimism following the Hamas victory or adopt their own form of rejectionism in its wake. Hamas must be offered a real chance to prove that it can be an acceptable political partner for a way forward. If the US and Israel cannot demonstrate such flexibility, matters will likely deteriorate into a situation even more dangerous than the one for which they frequently blamed the late Yasir Arafat.
Wayne White is an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute. Before his retirement in 2005, he served as Deputy Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research's Near Eastern Division and coordinated Iraqi Intelligence for INR.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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There are times when one does not wish to be vindicated. Anticipating the strengthening of Hamas, I winced when the Administration greeted with unseemly satisfaction the death of Yasir Arafat, which was characterized as a major breakthrough in a campaign for Middle East democratization.
On the eve of the Iraq war, I warned the Administration in an intelligence assessment (leaked by someone to the Los Angeles Times) that the establishment of thoroughgoing and enduring democracies in the Middle East would be a tough slog, for a variety of reasons, even if the Administration’s overly-optimistic goals in Iraq were successfully realized.
I was not alone. Such a conclusion was not difficult to reach: polling from a variety of sources proved beyond a shadow of a doubt some years ago that populations in the Middle East region generally had become more anti-American, more anti-Israeli, more Islamist, and less interested in the Western concept of women’s rights than most governments then in power, despite the other failings of many such governments.
It was fairly easy to surmise that new governments reflecting these attitudes would not be compatible with the Administration’s vision of democracy.
Now, we have the stunning triumph of Hamas, even more dramatic than the largely predictable success of Islamist Shi’a parties in Iraq’s recent elections. The Administration and Israel have again denounced Hamas as a terrorist group and an entity that could not be a partner, as is, in a process of engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian political arena.
We cannot and should not ignore the violent track record of Hamas and its militant charter. But Hamas in power is a reality on the Israeli-Palestinian stage, pure and simple. Efforts to sort out a way to work with Hamas must now be a top priority.
Whether it is Hamas on the Palestinian front or militant Sunni Arabs in Iraq, such powerful forces must, if possible, be drawn into the political mainstream. Exclusion is no longer a realistic option. In the face of this new reality, which stems in part from US efforts to promote democratization in the first place, Washington should lead the way in devising new strategies for engaging those formerly confined to the political fringe.
Many politicians and observers have argued (and will likely continue to do so) that negotiating with such groups is unacceptable because of their violent track records. Yet, all conflicts usually end because two warring parties sit down and talk.
Sometimes that engagement-- as with the conclusion of titanic struggles like the 20th Century’s two world wars-- occurs only because one side has been defeated, finds itself in a hopeless position, and is prepared to “surrender” or accept dictated terms. But beware: such terms often lead to more conflict down the road.
In less conventional and sometimes more prolonged scenarios, it is not surprising that some parties finally recognize the need to talk as relative equals. Yasir Arafat began as a “terrorist,” only to be embraced later as a partner. Others have swallowed hard and taken this route. It is now time for Israel and the international community to begin seriously exploring the possibility of usefully engaging Hamas. Early polling reportedly indicates that there is considerable popular support in Israel for moving in this direction.
Hamas also has obligations. Hamas must recognize that if engagement is to have any real value, it must reassess its past rejectionism. It has to be prepared to cast aside provocative and violent aspects of its program and transform itself into a tough advocate of Palestinian rights, not a source of or inspiration for suicide bombings. Arafat made the serious mistake of launching the second Intifada back in 2000, which devastated Palestinian infrastructure and shattered emerging Israeli-Palestinian trust. Hamas must avoid making the same mistake.
There may be opportunity in all this. The US and Israel cannot afford to wallow in recrimination and pessimism following the Hamas victory or adopt their own form of rejectionism in its wake. Hamas must be offered a real chance to prove that it can be an acceptable political partner for a way forward. If the US and Israel cannot demonstrate such flexibility, matters will likely deteriorate into a situation even more dangerous than the one for which they frequently blamed the late Yasir Arafat.
Wayne White is an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute. Before his retirement in 2005, he served as Deputy Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research's Near Eastern Division and coordinated Iraqi Intelligence for INR.