That maxim, one of Napoleon's best-known, may have worked well for a Bonaparte, but it also suggests a certain lack of clear planning for battle. Four weeks into its war in Lebanon, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are still engaged primarily in the immediate border zone, and rockets continue to pound northern Israel. And now, Israel's commander on the Lebanon front has been virtually superseded but not relieved by a superior.
Replacing a military commander, particularly a senior one, in the midst of a campaign is rare, and almost invariably shows a serious lack of confidence in the commander's ability. On August 8, IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz' office issued a brief statement announcing that "General Moshe Kaplinsky will coordinate the IDF's land, air and sea operations in the Lebanese theater. Chief of Staff Dan Halutz expresses total faith in the IDF command in general and the Northern Command in particular, and especially in the commander of the Northern Command." The Northern Command’s chief, Maj. Gen. Udi Adam, may enjoy his chief's "total faith," but he suddenly found himself with the Deputy Chief of Staff (Kaplinsky) looking over his shoulder. Israeli press reports indicate that Adam and his officers see the move as a slap in the face, as almost any commander would.
Under the IDF's command system, the individual regional commander manages operations. In the case of Lebanon, Northern Command, Adam himself is an experienced officer and ironically the son of Maj. Gen. Yekutiel Adam, who was killed at Beaufort Castle in Lebanon in 1982. The elder Adam had been Deputy Chief of Staff and was about to take up the Directorship of Mossad when he was killed in the earlier invasion of Lebanon. His son's appointment marked the first second-generation general to reach the General Staff.
The reshuffle appears to be a reaction to growing criticism of the IDF's performance after four weeks of fighting in Lebanon. The fog of war and the shroud of security over military plans and decision-making mean that it is difficult to know precisely what debates are going on within the IDF and the defense establishment, but the appointment of Kaplinsky however indicates some serious concerns within the General Staff. It may well be that Adam has been made a scapegoat because popular opinion is disappointed in the IDF's performance. What is clear is such discontent within the military in wartime is rare.
The move comes, however, in a context that is itself unusual in Israeli military history. The IDF's performance is being increasingly criticized. Much of northern Israel’s population is in shelters or fleeing the area. Rockets continue to land and the IDF is taking casualties and seems unable to advance deeply into Lebanon. (As this was written, the Security Cabinet had authorized a move up to the Litani River, but little about the fighting so far suggests that that will be easy.)
It should be emphasized that the growing criticism in the Israeli media and the political arena is not aimed at stopping the war. If anything, it is aimed at persuading the government to take even harsher measures.
There has been criticism of the political leadership based on the Prime Minister's and Defense Minister's reputed lack of military experience. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert served as an editor during his IDF service; Defense Minister Amir Peretz was a materiel officer who rose only to the rank of captain. There are also questions about the current IDF high command's performance.
Chief of Staff Halutz is the first Air Force Commander to rise to the top IDF command, and that may be related to the initial reliance on air power to take out Hizbullah's arsenal; unlike most of Israel's wars, ground forces reserves were not called up until after the war had been under way for some time.
Inter-service coordination is much more crucial than in many of Israel's previous wars. Coordinating the Air Force's bombing campaign, ground force operations in southern Lebanon, and naval shelling and blockade of the coast led to a decision (reportedly pushed by Maj. Gen. Adam) to give overall coordination to the Northern Command, which in the past would have commanded only the ground forces. The appointment of Kaplinsky suggests some dissatisfaction with that coordination. Kaplinsky, it should be noted, is an infantryman, a former commander of the elite Golani Brigade, and his increased role suggests the primary concern may be the performance of the Army in the ground campaign.
It also seems clear that Israel may have suffered from a major intelligence failure, perhaps on a par with that at the outset of the 1973 War. It clearly did not fully anticipate Hizbullah's capabilities in several key areas, including its anti-tank weaponry, the longer-range rockets fired into Israel in addition to the Katyushas, and the C-802 Chinese-made, Iranian-supplied anti-ship cruise missile which damaged the corvette Hanit early in the war. After years spent fighting the second Intifada, in which anti-tank weapons were unknown and rockets were limited to the homemade Qassams, the IDF was unprepared for a well-equipped and trained Hizbullah.
The Command reshuffle suggests some confusion within the IDF high command at the moment and genuine concern about what to do next. At the moment, indications are that this will lead to a greater, rather than a lessened, ground campaign.
Michael Collins Dunn is Editor of the Middle East Journal. He also writes the Estimate, a biweekly newsletter of intelligence and analysis. He has taught at several US universities and has authored a number of articles on the Middle East.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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On s'engage, et puis on voit.
(You engage, and then you see.)
That maxim, one of Napoleon's best-known, may have worked well for a Bonaparte, but it also suggests a certain lack of clear planning for battle. Four weeks into its war in Lebanon, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are still engaged primarily in the immediate border zone, and rockets continue to pound northern Israel. And now, Israel's commander on the Lebanon front has been virtually superseded but not relieved by a superior.
Replacing a military commander, particularly a senior one, in the midst of a campaign is rare, and almost invariably shows a serious lack of confidence in the commander's ability. On August 8, IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz' office issued a brief statement announcing that "General Moshe Kaplinsky will coordinate the IDF's land, air and sea operations in the Lebanese theater. Chief of Staff Dan Halutz expresses total faith in the IDF command in general and the Northern Command in particular, and especially in the commander of the Northern Command." The Northern Command’s chief, Maj. Gen. Udi Adam, may enjoy his chief's "total faith," but he suddenly found himself with the Deputy Chief of Staff (Kaplinsky) looking over his shoulder. Israeli press reports indicate that Adam and his officers see the move as a slap in the face, as almost any commander would.
Under the IDF's command system, the individual regional commander manages operations. In the case of Lebanon, Northern Command, Adam himself is an experienced officer and ironically the son of Maj. Gen. Yekutiel Adam, who was killed at Beaufort Castle in Lebanon in 1982. The elder Adam had been Deputy Chief of Staff and was about to take up the Directorship of Mossad when he was killed in the earlier invasion of Lebanon. His son's appointment marked the first second-generation general to reach the General Staff.
The reshuffle appears to be a reaction to growing criticism of the IDF's performance after four weeks of fighting in Lebanon. The fog of war and the shroud of security over military plans and decision-making mean that it is difficult to know precisely what debates are going on within the IDF and the defense establishment, but the appointment of Kaplinsky however indicates some serious concerns within the General Staff. It may well be that Adam has been made a scapegoat because popular opinion is disappointed in the IDF's performance. What is clear is such discontent within the military in wartime is rare.
The move comes, however, in a context that is itself unusual in Israeli military history. The IDF's performance is being increasingly criticized. Much of northern Israel’s population is in shelters or fleeing the area. Rockets continue to land and the IDF is taking casualties and seems unable to advance deeply into Lebanon. (As this was written, the Security Cabinet had authorized a move up to the Litani River, but little about the fighting so far suggests that that will be easy.)
It should be emphasized that the growing criticism in the Israeli media and the political arena is not aimed at stopping the war. If anything, it is aimed at persuading the government to take even harsher measures.
There has been criticism of the political leadership based on the Prime Minister's and Defense Minister's reputed lack of military experience. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert served as an editor during his IDF service; Defense Minister Amir Peretz was a materiel officer who rose only to the rank of captain. There are also questions about the current IDF high command's performance.
Chief of Staff Halutz is the first Air Force Commander to rise to the top IDF command, and that may be related to the initial reliance on air power to take out Hizbullah's arsenal; unlike most of Israel's wars, ground forces reserves were not called up until after the war had been under way for some time.
Inter-service coordination is much more crucial than in many of Israel's previous wars. Coordinating the Air Force's bombing campaign, ground force operations in southern Lebanon, and naval shelling and blockade of the coast led to a decision (reportedly pushed by Maj. Gen. Adam) to give overall coordination to the Northern Command, which in the past would have commanded only the ground forces. The appointment of Kaplinsky suggests some dissatisfaction with that coordination. Kaplinsky, it should be noted, is an infantryman, a former commander of the elite Golani Brigade, and his increased role suggests the primary concern may be the performance of the Army in the ground campaign.
It also seems clear that Israel may have suffered from a major intelligence failure, perhaps on a par with that at the outset of the 1973 War. It clearly did not fully anticipate Hizbullah's capabilities in several key areas, including its anti-tank weaponry, the longer-range rockets fired into Israel in addition to the Katyushas, and the C-802 Chinese-made, Iranian-supplied anti-ship cruise missile which damaged the corvette Hanit early in the war. After years spent fighting the second Intifada, in which anti-tank weapons were unknown and rockets were limited to the homemade Qassams, the IDF was unprepared for a well-equipped and trained Hizbullah.
The Command reshuffle suggests some confusion within the IDF high command at the moment and genuine concern about what to do next. At the moment, indications are that this will lead to a greater, rather than a lessened, ground campaign.
Michael Collins Dunn is Editor of the Middle East Journal. He also writes the Estimate, a biweekly newsletter of intelligence and analysis. He has taught at several US universities and has authored a number of articles on the Middle East.