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It is anything but a surprise that Algeria’s incumbent president Abdelaziz Bouteflika swept last week’s presidential elections winning a suspiciously high 83% of the vote. In a part of the world where incumbents give true meaning to the term “landslide victory,” the solid victory of Bouteflika is unremarkable. But we should be hesitant before casting these elections aside as merely another exercise in political futility because, regardless of the outcome, Algeria’s third successive multi-party presidential campaign was among the freest and most competitive ever held in the Arab world.

So, what was different? First, a major institutional shift occurred that, if maintained, has knocked-down a huge democratic roadblock. The army – who many suspect actually pull the political strings in Algeria – vowed to stay out of the electoral process completely. So far, they seemed to have kept their word. Granted, Bouteflika has always been dubbed the Army’s candidate so what might have happened had he lost in the first round remains a matter of speculation. Nevertheless, institutionally speaking, if the army continues to stay out of politics (perhaps staying on the sidelines with an eye on the game, as in Turkey), it represents a significant step in the Algerian democratization process.

The campaign also looked more like the 2004 elections in the US - complete with rallies, televised debates (albeit, late in the game for the opposition candidates), and candidates accusing each other of fraud and misrepresentation – than the typical perfunctory, predictable march to the ballots in most Arab elections. Six candidates ran in these elections representing a diverse set of political perspectives – and, most importantly, they all had enough faith in the process, sticking it out to the bitter end (as opposed to the 1999 elections where candidates pulled out at the 11th hour amidst accusations of corruption and fraud).

Compared to previous elections, there was also a drastic reduction in fraud and corruption. In the weeks leading up to the vote, Bouteflika invited 120 international observers to monitor the elections and several days later, representatives from a number of the international observation groups declared that these were among the cleanest elections ever to have been held in this part of the world. Admittedly, 120 observers cannot monitor 40,000 election booths, however, the invitation on the part of the incumbent to international observers sends a strong signal that Bouteflika and/or his cabal did not intend to pull off any major, pre-meditated election-rigging scams.

Finally, a woman and an Islamist were among the top candidates. The campaigns of Louisa Hannoun (a Trotskyist from the Workers Party) and Abdallah Djeballah (from the Islamic Party, El-Islah) signify a major development for two important constituencies in Middle Eastern democracy. Louisa Hannoun is the first woman to run as an official presidential candidate in the Arab world. In a region where half of the population usually sits on the sidelines economically, politically, and socially, this marks a major historical turning point for the role of the woman in the Arab World.

Djeballah’s candidacy was remarkable because in an era when the question of the “compatibility of Islam and democracy” is constantly debated, he has provided observable evidence that Muslims who desire a political system fused with their religious values can also play and accept the democratic rules. This is particularly significant in Algeria, a country that is fragilely balancing efforts to observe and preserve the religious beliefs and traditions of its population while at the same time trying to outflank an unfortunate violent and intolerant movement that has all but paralyzed the country much of the past ten years.

These elections underscore two often-overlooked realities about democracy in the Arab world. First, the democratic ideal is not totally foreign to Arabs. This campaign was characterized by enthusiasm, open debate, and a feeling that people believed in the right to choose their leader. We cannot be certain that political strings were not pulled behind the scenes and accusations of fraud have yet to be investigated but by and large, the fact that credible opponents ran, people voted, and the army stayed out indicates that this was far from a pointless exercise to re-elect an incumbent.

Secondly, even though legitimate opposition parties ran, at the end of the day, the majority of the people still chose the incumbent. This is perhaps a reflection that, despite a long-list of woes that face their country today, the Algerian people are not yet prepared to abandon fully their ties to the past – Bouteflika is an old-guard leader with direct ties to Algeria's struggle for independence. Many Algerians are still not ready to take the economic and social risks that would come with a brand new, untested leadership. Furthermore, Bouteflika's record during his first term is quite satisfactory - most importantly because under his leadership, violence has been drastically reduced and many Algerians have regained a sense of security absent for most of the past decade.

Our own complicated history in the US, as well as our recent efforts in Iraq, are both evidence that the democratic progress is slow, arduous, and continuously adjusting to the historical experiences, traditions, and values of a particular society. Keeping in mind the creeping pace of genuine democratic progress, the US might consider a few policies towards Algeria as it pursues its goal to establish democracy throughout the Arab world. First, the US should continue to encourage and support homegrown democratic trends within Algeria. Examples from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics show that outside assistance can help democracy take root in a country. Second, as in the case with Turkey and the EU, the US can use economic carrots to continue to encourage political and economic reform, for example speeding up Algerian accession into the WTO. The US can also work with Europe (which for security reasons related to international terrorism has a direct interest in improving Algerian economic conditions) to increase and facilitate economic activity between the EU and Algeria. Third, we should continue to take advantage of Algeria’s cooperation in the war on terrorism, providing military aid and training in exchange for intelligence sharing. The US should view this, however, as an opportunity to put serious pressure on the Algerian government to improve human rights and practice good governance under the rule of law.