The Middle East Institute -

The Jerusalem Old City Initiative

Mon, 6 Oct 2008 18:33:10 -0400

MEI and Foundation for Middle East Peace co sponsor a discussion with the leaders of the Jerusalem Old City Initiative, created to pursue creative governance and management options for Jerusalem's Old City.
Michael Bell, Professor of International Diplomacy at the University of Windsor, Canada, and former Canadian ambassador to Israel, Egypt and Jordan; John de Chastelain, former chief of Canada's Defence Staff, Ambassador to the United States and one of the three International Chairmen for the Northern Ireland Peace Process and Chairman of the Arms Decommissioning Commission; Marshall J. Breger, professor of law at the Columbus School of Law; Arthur Hughes, Adjunct Scholar at MEI and former Director General of the Egypt-Israel peacekeeping mission.

Deciding the Fate of the Mujahadin

Trita Parsi — Mon, 6 Oct 2008 15:30:48 -0400

The Bush administration inherited many of Iraq's problems when it invaded that country, including an Iranian terrorist organization funded and armed by Saddam Hussein the Mujahedin-e-Kalq (MKO). Though in the midst of a war on terror, the Bush administration chose in 2003 to protect 3,000 of the organization's militants and house them in a camp given to the group by Saddam — Camp Ashraf just north of Baghdad.

Ever since, the faith of this State Department-listed terrorist organization has been unclear. Hated by Iraqis for its involvement in Saddam's crimes against the Iraqi people, the Baghdad government wants to expel the group. But no country is willing to take them.

Though the Iranian government wants to put the group's leadership on trial in Iran, it seems less interested in the organization's rank and file. The European governments have little interest in taking in 3,000 battle-hardened Muslim militants, fearing that they will use Europe as a base to plan and execute further terrorist attacks.

The U.S., on the other hand, has already contradicted its own principles by giving preferential treatment to an organization on the State Department's terrorist list — even though President Bush himself pointed to the organization's patronage under Saddam Hussein as evidence of Iraq's support for international terrorists in his speech to the United Nations in September 2002.

"Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran," President Bush said. To complicate matters further, if reports that the U.S. has used MKO terrorists for cross-border raids into Iran are true, then Washington certainly doesn't want these militants to end up in Iranian hands.

Washington seems doomed if it does, doomed if it doesn't.
Members of the terrorist organization have protested outside the White House this past week, angered by the Bush administration's decision to hand over Camp Ashraf to the Iraqi government. The government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will surrender the MKO members to Tehran, they argue, who in turn will imprison and execute them.

Though approximately 500 MKO fighters have been repatriated to Iran and no reports of abuse have emerged according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which oversaw their return, sending rank-and-file Mujahedin members to Iran against their will would be irresponsible.

Hated by the Iranian people for having fought on Saddam's side in the Iraq-Iran war, the Iranian Mujahedin is understandably fearful of the fate awaiting them in Iran. After all, the Iranian government systematically violates the human rights of journalists and union leaders alike, let alone anti-Iranian terrorists.
Yet, contrary to the protesters outside the White House, the issue is not a choice between freedom in Camp Ashraf and captivity in Iran.

The Mujahedin is not an effective opposition to the unpopular government in Iran as the organization's defenders in Washington claim, but a politico-religious cult that brainwashes its members, places children of Mujahedin members with other families in order to prevent parents from defecting, and who according to Human Rights Watch, maintains control by torturing its rank and file. "Members who try to leave the Mujahedin pay a very heavy price," according to Joe Stork of Human Rights Watch.

Its involvement in terrorism is undisputed. It assassinated several Americans in Iran in the 1970s. It supported the taking of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and blasted Ayatollah Khomeini for releasing the American diplomats in 1981, arguing instead that the hostages should have been executed. It made a pact with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and fought alongside his army against their Iranian countrymen. Later in the 1990s, they became Saddam's most trusted henchmen, tasked with quelling Kurdish and Shiite uprisings against the Iraqi dictator.

According to defectors, Mujahedin members in Camp Ashraf celebrated the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

In 2004, French authorities descended upon the Mujahedin headquarters in France, arresting the leader of the cult, Maryam Rajavi. Immediately, zealous Mujahedin members staged hunger strikes and several set themselves ablaze. Hardly the behavior of a democratically oriented opposition group.

But the vast majority of the Camp Ashraf residents are not so much members of a terrorist cult as they are victims of it. The camp is itself a prison. It may have provided Mujahedin militants with protection against ordinary Iraqis who sought to avenge their relatives killed by the Mujahedin at the behest of Saddam Hussein, but the prison has primarily enabled the leaders of the terrorist organization to prevent the rank and file from defecting.

Rather than debating where to expel the Mujahedin terrorists, help should be provided to the rank and file to break with the cult and make free choices about their future. It's the only humanitarian solution to this dilemma - and one that defeats rather than protects this anti-American terrorist group.

From Khartoum to Meroe

Andrew Watkins — Mon, 6 Oct 2008 10:50:45 -0400

Recently, I took a journey with the English language professors of the University of Al-Neelain in Khartoum to the Pyramids of Meroe, some 300 kilometers away. While the pyramids are a testament to the power of the ancient civilizations that produced them, this is not a story of those civilizations but rather a view into modern Sudan.

New Library Hours: Mon-Thurs: 10 am-6pm, Friday 10am-5pm

Fri, 3 Oct 2008 10:13:00 -0400

Saudi Arabia Opening to Tourists

Tue, 30 Sep 2008 10:56:42 -0400

Many people snickered when Saudi Arabia announced a few years ago that it would create a tourism industry as part of a long-term effort to diversify its oil-dependent economy.

Tourism in Saudi Arabia? The forbidding alcohol-free kingdom where women are veiled, shops close at prayer time, religious enforcers patrol the streets, criminals are beheaded in public and the most important sites are off-limits to non-Muslims? What a joke.

Perhaps it’s time to stop chuckling. Crystal Cruises, a luxury cruise ship line that caters to affluent Americans, has added the Saudi port city of Jeddah to its ports of call. The Crystal Serenity, a 1,080-passenger liner, is scheduled to make its first stop in Saudi Arabia on March 23, 2010.

This is intriguing news for travelers, but it represents much more for Saudi Arabia. It can be read as a statement from the country’s rulers that they are determined to open up the country and engage with the world, despite what is certain to be outraged opposition from Saudi Arabia’s xenophobic religious and social conservatives.

For decades Saudi Arabia was difficult for non-Muslims to visit, but it mattered little because few people other than pilgrims headed for Mecca wanted to go there anyway, except on business. Now under the leadership of King Abdullah, the country is opening itself more and more to outsiders—issuing multiple-entry visas, creating an international university and hosting regional sports tournaments and even cultural events. The efforts of the Supreme Commission for Tourism are part of that trend, which has been driven mostly by the economic imperatives of creating new jobs and building self-sustaining industries beyond oil and petrochemicals.

The commission, headed by Prince Sultan bin Salman, an American-educated astronaut and grandson of the kingdom’s founder, has focused mostly on domestic tourism. The aim was to persuade Saudis to spend their holidays at home, on the Red Sea beaches or in the mountains of the sparsely-populated southwest. Welcoming boatloads of non-Muslim foreigners is another matter.

The cruise passengers may provide temporary employment for bus drivers and tour guides, but it is likely their presence will agitate the monarchy’s vocal Islamist critics. In Egypt, cruise ship day-trippers travel in armed convoys because of the security threat. What will be the security challenge in Saudi Arabia, where in recent years extremists have killed French travelers and attacked the US consulate in Jeddah?

According to Crystal’s announcement, the Serenity is scheduled to arrive in Jeddah at 8 a.m. and depart at 6 p.m. the same day. This is standard practice for cruise lines, which organize day trips to onshore sites and then sail on to the next destination in the evening.

But how many of the Serenity’s passengers, who on most cruises include many Jews, will want to disembark in Saudi Arabia? The State Department’s most recent travel warning “urges U.S. citizens to consider carefully the risks of traveling to Saudi Arabia” where “there is an ongoing security threat due to the continued presence of terrorist groups...”

For the passengers who do go ashore, there are other questions: What will the women wear? What will there be to see? Mecca is a short drive away but off-limits. The great Nabatean ruins at Midan Saleh and the vistas of Asir National Park are too far away for day trips. And will any passengers be permitted to disembark on their own and visit Jeddah independently of an organized tour, as some routinely do in other ports?

On its Web site, Crystal describes Jeddah as if it were an Arab Barcelona: “Jeddah is a dynamic and cosmopolitan commercial hub. It is also an artistic one, with public art on display on its roundabouts. In fact, the collection, which includes works by Alexander Calder and Joan Miro, makes the city the largest open-air art gallery in the world. For shopaholics, Jeddah is a paradise...And for anyone who appreciates scenic beauty, there are lovely beaches and a picturesque corniche, where locals and visitors alike can be found relaxing and drinking in the views.”

Jeddah is indeed interesting, but also hot, crowded and choked with traffic. The restored old city and its souk would take perhaps an hour to visit. And, while there is good snorkeling in the Red Sea, few beaches permit western-style bathing attire.

Crystal Cruises is Japanese-owned and its ships are registered in the Bahamas, but its offices are in Los Angeles and the great majority of its passengers are Americans. Like most cruise lines, it is always looking for new and offbeat destinations, and its 2010 itinerary in the Middle East reflects that quest. In addition to Jeddah, the Serenity is scheduled to call at Bandar Abbas, Iran; Khasab, Oman, on the Strait of Hormuz; and Ashdod, Israel.

MEI Garden Reception with Ali bin Tamin, CEO of Kalima

Mon, 29 Sep 2008 12:39:01 -0400

MEI is honored to host Ali bin Tamin, CEO of Kalima, a non-profit initiative founded by the Abu Dhabi Authority for Culture and Heritage in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for a morning reception in the MEI Garden.

Kalima, which means “word” in Arabic, funds the translation, publication, and distribution of high-quality works of classic and contemporary writing from other languages into Arabic. The initiative brings together authors, translators, publishers and distributors.

“How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al-Qaeda”

Seth Jones and Martin Libicki — Thu, 25 Sep 2008 13:48:01 -0400

Seth Jones emphasized the importance of his and Martin Libicki’s report given the seeming interminability of al-Qaeda seven years after President George W. Bush declared a Global War on Terror. According to Jones, the ineffectiveness of military force in eradicating terrorism has necessitated a reevaluation and reprioritization of US counterterrorism policy. The authors’ report entitled “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda” examines data from 648 terrorist groups since 1968 and highlights the political, economic, and social factors contributing to their devolution. Jones contended that by examining the historical record of past counterterrorism endeavors, the United States could formulate a more efficient and suitable strategy for combating al-Qaeda.

Before elucidating the report’s findings, Jones summarized the state of al-Qaeda in the world today. He claimed that al-Qaeda’s organizational scheme resembles “rings of concentric circles” orbiting a “core” of key leaders like Osama bin Laden. These individuals plot and orchestrate terrorist operations like 9/11 from clandestine locations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Due to their isolation, they rely heavily on several affiliated terrorist networks for providing and disseminating information, recruiting new members, and executing attacks. The third and fourth “rings” consist of individuals who are deeply influenced by al-Qaeda’s ideology and who occasionally perform acts of terror in the organization’s name. In addition to al-Qaeda’s large and diffuse membership, and concentric organizational structure, Jones emphasized the broad and largely unattainable goals of its leaders.

In the next portion of his lecture, Jones detailed the findings of his report. Upon testing various causal factors against historical data, Jones and Libicki concluded that the vast majority of terrorist groups have terminated due to political settlements (43%) or policing and intelligence activities (40%). Military operations, by contrast, accounted for only 7% of successful defeats. Furthermore, the authors discerned no statistical correlation between terrorist groups’ devolutions and economic conditions, political institutions, and breadth of goals.

What implications do these results have for current US counterterrorism policy? Jones asserted that military force continues to represent a counterproductive strategy for defeating al-Qaeda because it inflicts a high civilian death toll and emboldens terrorists’ “holy war” rhetoric. Instead, Jones posited, by leveraging legitimate local actors and surreptitiously targeting key players, the United States could more credibly and effectively pursue its strategic interests. In practice this means that the US government should support indigenous police forces, target key leaders, and engage in clandestine intelligence gathering and analysis. It should also empower organizations such as the State Department, CIA, and FBI, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, to develop and implement counterterrorism policies in the United States and abroad.

Thus far, these tactics have accrued auspicious success in places like Ramadi, Iraq where large numbers of Sunni insurgents, with American backing, have joined Iraqi police forces to help rout al-Qaeda in Iraq. Additionally, the use of local Pakistani informants and intelligence agents has led to the capture and arrest of key terrorists like Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (in March 2002 and 2003, respectively). Although Jones admitted the potential failure of these strategies if local populations refuse to cooperate or possess conflicting strategic visions, he reemphasized that the “war on terror” could not be won by military force alone.

"How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda"

Wed, 24 Sep 2008 16:44:35 -0400

MEI is honored to host Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, to discuss their new Rand Corp. report,"How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda."

About the Report:

All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa'ida.

Find our more about the report here: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741/

President Zardari - Hope or Despair?

Wed, 24 Sep 2008 11:09:37 -0400

Asif Ali Zardari was voted President of Pakistan by an overwhelming majority, just as the post February election alignment had projected. In the national and provincial elections, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) emerged as the single largest party in the National Assembly and did well in all of the four provinces, especially in Sindh. Taking advantage of its strength, the co-chairman of the PPP was able to maneuver a majority in Baluchistan and a coalition in the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab. At present, with the exception of Punjab, it is a partner in the government in all the political arrangements of Pakistan. Many analysts give credit for this success to Zardari, citing his political “wisdom and skills”. Others agree that his rise to power would not have been possible without compromises made with Musharraf and other actors of the establishment. Whatever the reality, Zardari is in charge of the political landscape of Pakistan, with enormous powers provided by a distorted constitution from the rule of General Musharraf.

Article 41 of the 1973 Constitution regards the president as a symbol of the federation of Pakistan. Thus, the president is expected to be above political divides. The constitution in its original form provides a parliamentary form of government so the real power rests with the prime minister and the national parliament. In the past, the three presidents, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Leghari and Rafiq Tarar steered clear of the internal political agendas of their political parties. The founding fathers of Pakistan visualized a parliamentary democracy. That should be the only objective of the current political actors.

Regardless of the debate about whether or not real power rests in the office of the prime minister and the parliament, the three branches of government – executive, legislature and judiciary must operate on the basis of checks and balances in order for a healthy political process to function. With the election of Asif Ali Zardari, the balance shifts heavily in favor of the president, thus compromising the spirit of parliamentary democracy. President Zardari’s position as the co-chairman of the ruling party makes him a kind of super prime minister. Furthermore, the judges deposed on November 2, 2007 by President Musharraf have not been restored and so the superior judiciary comes under the influence of the newly elected president.
To create a workable political system and a true spirit of democracy, President Zardari should take a number of corrective steps. First, the judiciary must be restored to its November 2, 2007 position. This should not take place on a pick-and-choose basis. A law minister recently spoke of the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry taking his oath from the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) Chief Justice, which is a discouraging sign given that the PCO was established under the previous emergency rule. It gives the impression that the new government wants to have a judiciary of its choice. It is not a question of personal likes and dislikes. It is a question of adhering to the principle that a commander of the army has no legitimacy to arrest or remove judges. Musharraf’s act was illegitimate and immoral act and must be reversed.
The second measure Zardari must take is the repeal of the 17th amendment of the constitution and other changes in the supreme law. These amendments and changes were introduced to enhance Musharraf’s powers, effectively transforming the constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential form of government and giving the president enormous powers. President Zardari can undo these wrongs by surrendering these powers to the prime minister and to the parliament, thus restoring the true spirit of the 1973 constitution. There is a lot of suspicion in the country that Zardari might take only cosmetic steps, thus retaining the president’s current powerful position.

Even with reduced constitutional powers, President Zardari can influence the process of peace making in the border areas of Northwest Pakistan and the Baluchistan province. The new president can use his influence to defuse the conflict through dialogue with his fellow Pakistanis. Musharraf alienated these vital sections of society by resorting to ruthless force. He acted like a proxy to a big power, looking after their interests rather than protecting his own citizens. President Zardari could also enhance his prestige by seeking the whereabouts of missing Pakistanis – a huge issue which directly relates to the humiliation of the entire nation.

President Asif Ali Zardari has gained the confidence of the legislatures. He should feel confident and reassured enough to restore the rule of law and with it the sovereignty, respect and dignity of Pakistan.

“America’s Midlife Crisis: The Future of a Troubled Superpower”

Dr. Gary Weaver and Adam Mendelson — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 10:15:45 -0400

Adam Mendelson began the discussion by highlighting key questions about American culture: who we are as Americans, why we are the way we are, and what we hold in common as national values and characteristics. In addition, he explained where American identity comes from and where it is heading in the future.

Mendelson stated that true intercultural understanding comes from knowing how people from other cultures view the world. Mendelson further articulated that Americans often lack a complete sense of cultural awareness and are not heavily interested in global affairs. Referring to a quote from historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Mendelson explained that history serves the nation as memory serves the individual, and to lose a sense of either is highly problematic.

Dr. Gary Weaver spoke second, contending that many books written on history have occupied a separate realm from books written on culture. Weaver and Mendelson intended to blend these two perspectives into one book using historical sociology and analysis through a cross-cultural and intercultural framework. Weaver discussed U.S. history through the metaphor of a life cycle. He referred to the period until the Spanish American War as America's childhood, when its geographic isolation from other nations made the country lean towards non-interventionism. After the Spanish-American War and World War I, America entered its teenage years of what Weaver termed "unrequited love," when America’s overseas involvement in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba only incurred animosity. The rejection of America's intervention led to a resurgence of isolationist sentiment in the country. During World War II and the start of the Cold War, America’s "young adulthood" began. It was a time when the country realized it could not truly withdraw from the international stage.

Weaver identified September 11, 2001 as the start of a new period in America’s development. “America's Midlife Crisis,” is an attempt to understand where the United States and its foreign policy will head in this new era. Returning to the metaphor of America as an individual going through a midlife crisis, Weaver asserted that America faces tough decisions about whether it will revert to the behaviors of its youth or move forward towards maturity. Weaver concluded by stating that the last chapter of the book is intended to provide insight into where America’s culture is heading in the future and what the early indications are for how the country will emerge from its current identity crisis. "America’s Midlife Crisis" traces how a superpower reached middle age and what America’s midlife crisis means for the its future.

The Jerusalem Old City Initiative

Michael Bell, John de Chastelain, Marshall J. Breger and Arthur Hughes — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 09:40:22 -0400

This event is co-sponsored with the Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP).

At its core, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about control over Jerusalem's Holy Sites, the most important of which are located in the Old City. Sites such as the Temple Mount and Western Wall are powerful religious, cultural and emotional symbols which must be administered with fairness and equity if the profound needs of the stakeholders are to be met. Without mutually-agreed and sustainable arrangements for the Old City, enduring peace for Israel with Palestinians and Arabs will be unattainable. The Jerusalem Old City Initiative was created to pursue creative governance and management options for Jerusalem's Old City. For over four years, working in close consultation with Palestinian, Israeli, regional and international experts and advisors, the JOCI has been working toward this end.

Appearing for the JOCI will be Michael Bell, Professor of International Diplomacy at the University of Windsor, Canada, and former Canadian career foreign service officer including assignments as Ambassador to Israel, Egypt and Jordan; John de Chastelain, retired general, former chief of Canada's Defence Staff, Ambassador to the United States and one of the three International Chairmen for the Northern Ireland Peace Process and Chairman of the Arms Decommissioning Commission; Marshall J. Breger, professor of law at the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America, a former senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, Solicitor and Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor, alternate delegate to the UN HRC, chair of the administrative conference of the US, visiting professor of law at Hebrew University and Bar-Ilan University, and President Reagan's liaison to the Jewish community; and Arthur Hughes, former US foreign service officer with service as Deputy in Israel, Ambassador to Yemen and deputy assistant secretary of Defense and also of State, he was director general of the MFO, Israel-Egypt peacekeeping, and is now an adjunct scholar at MEI.

To RSVP please email: info@fmep.org 202-835-3650

"The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future"

Book Launch with Bruce Riedel — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 09:15:30 -0400

MEI is honored to host Bruce Riedel to discuss his new book "The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future."

About the Book:

Several outstanding books have been written about the road to September 11. The Search for Al Qaeda has a different mission. While it does review how al Qaeda was created and developed, it focuses more closely on what has happened to the terrorist network since that awful day. According to Riedel, al Qaeda's ultimate goals are to drive America from the Muslim world (the ummah); to destroy Israel; and to create a jihadist caliphate along the lines of the Ottoman Empire at its height. The book reveals al Qaeda's multi-pronged strategy for accomplishing those goals; draw America into the type of "bleeding wars" that drove the Soviets from Afghanistan, build a safe haven for al Qaeda in Pakistan; develop other "franchises" in the Islamic world that can overthrow pro-American regimes; and conduct more Western attacks along the lines of 9-11 or the transit bombings in Madrid and London. Bruce Riedel is an expert on the Middle East and South Asia, with 30 years of policymaking experience in regional diplomacy and counterterrorism. He draws on this experience and firsthand knowledge in profiling the four most important figures in the al Qaeda movement: Osama bin Laden, its creator and charismatic leader: ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian co-leader of al Qaeda and its principal spokesman; Abu Musaib al Zarqawi, the tenacious leader of al Qaeda in Iraq until his death in 2006; and Mullah Omar, Taliban host to al Qaeda. These profiles provide the base from which Riedel delivers a much clearer understanding of al Qaeda and what must be done to counter it.

About the Author

Bruce Riedel is a former CIA officer who focuses on political transition, terrorism and conflict resolution. He was a senior adviser to three US presidents on Middle East and South Asian issues. He is currently a Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution.

MEI Garden Reception with Ali bin Tamin, CEO of Kalima

Ali bin Tamin — Mon, 22 Sep 2008 11:41:08 -0400

The reception will also include a special poetry reading from Sonia Sanchez, one of the authors whose work Kalima has translated into Arabic.

A report from the UN Development Programme dramatically highlights the reality that very few foreign works have found their way into Arabic reporting that Spain translates in one year the number of books that have been translated into Arabic in the past 1,000 years, and for every one million Arabs only one book is translated into Arabic each year. This is a gap that Kalima aims to close.

Representatives of Kalima are in Washington, DC as part of Kalima’s sponsorship of the National Book Festival The annual event, sponsored by the Library of Congress, will take place on the National Mall on September 27.

As part of the National Book Festival activities, Kalima is inviting Americans to nominate literature by US authors for translation with the goal of building understanding between the United States and Arab speakers. (For additional information on Kalima, visit: www.kalima.ae/eng.php More information about the National Book Festival, to be held Saturday, September 27, is available at www.loc.gov/bookfest).

Israel's Kadima Contest

Fri, 19 Sep 2008 18:05:52 -0400

Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni narrowly won the Kadima party’s internal election this week to become chairwoman of Israel’s largest party and will replace Ehud Olmert within a few days. Olmert will remain as Prime Minister, however, until Livni succeeds in assembling a majority coalition in the Knesset. She has 42 days to accomplish that task; new elections will be called automatically if she fails, which would probably not be held until February at the earliest.

It should be noted that Livni won by only 1.1% of the vote ahead of her chief rival, former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz. Hurt and angry in the wake of his narrow defeat, Mofaz has announced he is taking a “time out” from politics. This presumably means he will not lead an internal opposition to Livni but also might possibly erode her support in the center-right of the party and the country.

Livni has a good chance of putting together a coalition, but it is by no means assured. The second largest party, Labor, is headed by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has made no secret of his intense ambition to regain the post. However, he realizes that Labor is unlikely to gain in new elections held soon, so it will most likely join Kadima, as will the small left-Zionist Meretz party and the remnants of the new Pensioners party. All told, this only provides about 57 of the 61 votes needed for a majority.

Theoretically, there are two ways to get to the magic 61. One is to include some or all of the three “Arab parties”, which together have ten votes. This is highly unlikely, as Israel has never had a coalition including these parties and many Jewish Israelis might well consider it illegitimate. Additionally, although Livni is a dove in the larger Israeli political context, it is unlikely that they would be willing to endorse her security policies, i.e., the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

Livni’s background as a former hawk is very similar to Olmert’s, and her current views have followed the same trajectory as his. The one exception is that he still promises an agreement with the Palestinians before he leaves office and before Bush’s Jan. 1 deadline while she, like virtually everyone else, has apparently given that up. We may assume she will continue with the ongoing negotiations that she is already leading. These would include the same promises to give up most of the West Bank to a Palestinian state, and the same constraints not to immediately discuss Jerusalem or address the Palestinian demand to the “right of return”. The probability, at least until the end of the year, is a continuation of the current situation.

In the longer term, things will not be so smooth. Palestinian President Abbas’s term ends in January and there are indications that he will try to extend it for a year, although Hamas and others may not accept this. Also, Israel’s 6-month tahdiya (calming) with Hamas in Gaza is due to expire in December, and Hamas will almost certainly demand concessions to renew it. Perhaps most important, the entire Middle East is in a comparative political lull, almost certainly in anticipation of the election of the new US President and the start of his term.

Since a coalition with the three Arab parties is ruled out, Livni is left with the more likely alternative: a coalition including the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox party Shas. They have twelve Knesset votes and are already a member of the current coalition. However, Shas is extremely unpopular with Israel’s secular population and has announced that it will demand considerable funding for its network of schools and other institutions in return for joining. There is also some speculation that they would be reluctant to support a female Prime Minister (the first since Golda Meir resigned in 1974). Shas is also moderately confident of its fate in new elections but cannot be sure it would be included in a government at that point.

If Livni fails to form a viable government and new elections are called next month, the probable winner would be the right-wing parties, especially Likud’s Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu, who would be the likely new Prime Minister, barring unexpected developments (which are always possible). In any case, Olmert will remain Prime Minister until a new government is sworn in, probably in 6-7 months if a general election is held.

However, it is more likely that, following melodramatic negotiations, Livni will get her majority and will form a government. In that case, new general elections must be held within two years, most probably sometime in late 2009 or early 2010.

The old cliché of plus ca change, plus la meme chose is completely applicable here. It is improbable even if Livni forms her government that she will emerge as a strong leader in the mold of many of Israel’s earlier Prime Ministers. Rather, the divisions within Israel and the stalemate with the Palestinians both seem likely to continue.

For Americans concerned about Israelis and Palestinians however, the important question is: which of the current candidates for president is most likely to help the parties break the stalemate? Without constructive American help, more decades of stalemate and bloodshed may ensue.

Iraq: Security Gains in Jeopardy

Fri, 19 Sep 2008 17:38:11 -0400

The bulk of the improvement in security in much of Iraq over the past two years stems not from the surge, but rather the largely Sunni Arab “Awakening.” Yet, revived Iraqi government hostility toward the Awakening, and provocative moves by Iraq’s Kurds have made those security gains potentially very fragile, raising the risk of a significant rebound in violence.

The surge initiated by President Bush in January 2007 had two main objectives: to stabilize Baghdad during a wave of horrific sectarian violence spanning many mixed areas of the country, pitting Sunni Arab against Shi’a, and to create a period of calm during which there could be sectarian reconciliation. Only a small portion of the roughly 29,000 U.S. soldiers included in the surge was dispatched to predominantly Sunni Arab al-Anbar Governate, the scene of heavy fighting between U.S. forces on the one hand and Sunni Arab insurgents and elements of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) on the other. Virtually all other surge-related U.S. troops were deployed into Baghdad.

The most important element in dramatically reducing violence was not the surge, but rather a deal between U.S. forces and Sunni Arab tribal and insurgent elements in late 2006 that translated the Awakening among many Sunni Arabs into stunning progress in terms of overall security and reduced U.S. casualties. Elements of the Awakening first approached U.S. forces seeking a deal two years earlier.

In summer 2004, Sunni Arab tribal leaders and notables, some with ties to the insurgency and most from al-Anbar Governate, asked that U.S. forces enter into a truce that would allow all concerned to join in an effort to destroy AQI. Many Sunni Arabs had become enraged over excesses on part of AQI’s militant Islamic fighters.

There was, however, one important condition: these Sunni Arabs would not make their peace with the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government. At a time when elections for a sovereign Iraqi government still lay ahead and the process of putting in place a new constitution was incomplete, Washington declined. The U.S. persuaded some of those who had approached us to meet with then Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi to try to work something out, but the talks failed. As a result, Sunni Arab insurgents and U.S. forces would fight on for two more years, at great cost to both. In addition, AQI remained largely free to continue its reign of terror, particularly anti-Shi’a suicide bombings.

Only when those same bombings triggered massive Sunni Arab-Shi’a sectarian violence following AQI’s bombing of the Shi’a Golden Mosque in north-central Iraq in early 2006 did the U.S. once again consider a separate deal with armed Sunni Arabs aimed at AQI. In the face of bitter objections from Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, the U.S. finally agreed to a conditional ceasefire with many Sunni Arab insurgent and tribal elements, allowing them to arm and to organize. By late 2007, it was clear that this arrangement, which expanded far beyond al-Anbar Governate, vastly reduced U.S. casualties and allowed both sides to administer crippling blows to AQI.

The Iraqi government never signed onto the overall arrangement, despite the nearly 90% reduction in anti-Shi’a AQI suicide bombings and a major shift on the part of those in the Awakening (eventually numbering around 100,000 fighters called “Sons of Iraq” or SOI’s) who now wanted to be incorporated into government security forces. Likewise, despite some measures in that direction, the government has dragged its feet on broader reconciliation with the Sunni Arab community, even though the surge was aimed at tamping down sectarian violence to provide the calm needed for that very purpose.

The government’s attitude became especially problematic when the U.S. turned control of SOI-dominated al-Anbar Governate back to the Iraqi government in recent weeks and made clear that the U.S. could not continue paying SOI’s much longer. The Baghdad government, however, had only agreed to accept a limited number of SOI’s into its security forces, and even doing that had proceeded at a snail’s pace.

Making matters even worse, over the past several weeks, Maliki declared over 600 SOI’s “criminals” subject to immediate arrest and his intent to end the SOI’s this year. That, of course, already has caused some SOI’s to desert and others to return to the residual Sunni Arab insurgency. Talks between SOI leaders and the government to increase the number of SOI’s taken into the security forces last week reportedly ended in stalemate.

If that were not enough, armed Kurdish Peshmerga personnel have gained control of increased areas--some far beyond the boundaries of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) zone--arresting or apparently seeking to displace inhabitants of such areas, many of them Sunni Arabs. Kurdish moves have been so provocative in some locales that even Maliki finally reacted, using non-Kurdish Iraqi army units to force a few Peshmerga withdrawals. Nonetheless, Kurdish flags are flying defiantly in numerous Kurdish areas well beyond the KRG, which contain substantial Sunni Arab populations. This—coupled with arrests and harassment-has infuriated Arab notables and SOI’s elements.

So Sunni Arab elements comprising the Awakening now find themselves assailed on two fronts, with levels of tension rising ominously. It would be sadly ironic if the Awakening (the main driver of improved security in so many areas beyond the more restricted scope of the surge) was to collapse, many SOI’s were to turn against the government, and, now, Iraq’s Kurds (or both).

These risky Iraqi government actions stem, in part, from the Bush Administration’s unconditional support. In late 2006, the Iraq Study Group recommended that U.S. support for the Iraqi government be made conditional, linked to progress on matters like reconciliation, in an effort to make it more likely that Maliki & Co. would avoid these nasty scenarios and to prevent Washington from being viewed as complicit in any government misbehavior. Failure to do so was a mistake, but there do not appear to be indications that the President is contemplating any change in this questionable course.

"Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within."

Fri, 19 Sep 2008 14:54:35 -0400

Middle East Institute is honored to host Shuja Nawaz, to discuss his new book, "Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within."

About the Book:

Based on 30 years of research and analysis, this definitive book is a profound, multi-layered, and historical analysis of the nature and role of the Pakistan army in the country's polity as well as its turbulent relationship with the United States. Shuja Nawaz examines the army and Pakistan in both peace and war. Using many hitherto unpublished materials from the archives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army, as well as interviews with key military and political figures in Pakistan and the United States, he sheds light not only on the Pakistan Army and its US connections but also on Pakistan as a key Muslim country in one of the world's toughest neighborhoods. In doing so, he lays bare key facts about Pakistan's numerous wars with India and its many rounds of political musical chairs, as well as the Kargil conflict of 1999. He then draws lessons from this history that may help Pakistan end its wars within and create a stabler political entity.

“Prophets and Princes - Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present”

Mark Weston — Fri, 19 Sep 2008 11:34:52 -0400

MEI is honored to host Mark Weston, to discuss his new book, “Prophets and Princes – Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present.”

About the Book:

Saudi Arabia is easy to criticize. It is the birthplace of Osama bin Laden and fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers. Saudi women are not permitted to drive, work with men, or travel without a man’s permission. Prior to 9/11, the Saudis sent millions of dollars abroad to schools that taught Muslim extremism and to charities that turned out to be fronts for al-Qaeda. Yet the country is the economic and spiritual center of the Middle East, the source of one fourth of the world’s oil, and the cradle of Islam.

In “Prophets and Princes” Mark Weston, a scholar who has lived in Saudi Arabia, writes that despite its serious shortcomings, the Saudi kingdom is still America’s most important ally in the Middle East. The country is a voice for moderation toward Israel and on the price of oil, and it is starting to make the economic and cultural changes necessary to adjust to modern realities.

Most books on Saudi Arabia focus on current events and give short shrift to the long history that is the key to understanding the Saudis. “Prophets and Princes” begins with the birth of Muhammad in 570, but almost half of the book is a revealing portrait of Saudi Arabia today. Drawing on interviews with many Saudi men and women, Weston portrays a complex society in which sixty percent of Saudi Arabia’s university students are women, and citizens who seek a constitutional monarchy can petition the king without fear of reprisal.

Author Bio

Mark Weston, a former Visiting Scholar at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, has been a lawyer for ABC Television and a journalist for ABC News. His articles have been published in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Los Angeles Times. He is the author of Giants of Japan, The Lives of Japan’s Greatest Men and Women and The Land and People of Pakistan.

“Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East”

Thomas W. Lippman — Thu, 18 Sep 2008 16:22:13 -0400

Lippman began his discussion of the book with a question about US policy in the Middle East: “How did this get to be our problem?” In an effort to answer this question Lippman identified key moments in Colonel Eddy’s life that can shed light on the nature of U.S. relations with the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia.

Lippman started his account of Colonel Eddy’s life with his birth and education. Eddy was born in Lebanon in 1896 to Protestant missionaries, and Lippman suggests it was assumed that the young man would pursue a life of academia or military service. Eddy graduated from Princeton in 1917 and received a direct commission to the United States Marine Corps as an intelligence officer. Following harrowing experiences on the battlefield during World War I, Captain Eddy returned to the U.S. and received his Ph.D, also from Princeton University.

Lippman explained that the next few years of Eddy’s life consisted of a few professorships, and the position of President of Hobart College in Geneva, N.Y. Realizing his distaste for academic politics and noticing the signs of the imminent Second World War, Eddy returned to his uniform and active duty in Cairo. After three months of service, Eddy was called back to Washington by President Roosevelt, where he was instrumental in the development of the OSS, the precursor to the CIA.

Eddy’s close friendship with ‘Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, the founding king of Saudi Arabia, and his ability to gain the esteem of the leaders of the Arab world, aided the U.S. in maintaining and building relations within the Middle East. This influential role allowed Colonel Eddy to lay the groundwork for U.S.-Arab oil trade, the Trans Arabian Pipeline, and the beginnings of diplomatic relations with Yemen. Lippman’s candid account of the Colonel’s handiwork included the mention of his instrumental role in the creation of the CIA as a member of the Interagency Committee of 1947. Eddy eventually resigned from service due to his wife’s illness, but some suggest that his distress over President Truman’s view on Palestine and Zionism may have influenced his decision.

Lippman concluded the discussion by expressing Eddy’s inability to reconcile himself with the creation of Israel. Lippman also spoke about Eddy’s efforts to enlist others in his cause, as he felt the relations he had worked so hard to build between the Arab people and the United States were slowly disintegrating.

"America's Midlife Crisis: The Future of a Troubled Superpower"

Thu, 18 Sep 2008 15:31:22 -0400

Middle East Institute is honored to host Gary Weaver and Adam Mendelson, Managing Editor of The Middle East Journal, to discuss their new book, "America's Midlife Crisis: The Future of a Troubled Superpower."

"Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East"

Tue, 16 Sep 2008 14:46:33 -0400

MEI is honored to host Thomas W. Lippman, MEI Adjunct Scholar to discuss his new book, "Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East."