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Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Regional Stability

A part of The Middle East Journal Resource Series

The Middle East Journal Resource Series offers compilations of Journal articles related to topics of interest in digital format.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Regional Stability is on sale for $10 and contains articles that can not be found in digital format elsewhere. You may purchase CDs from The Middle East Journal Resource Series at the Middle East Institute's front desk or by contacting Lisa Barr at (202) 785-1141 ext. 200 or members@mideasti.org

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Regional Stability contains the following two Perspectives, three Journal articles, and transcript, and provides scholarly and in-depth background to the present situation in Southeast Asia and regional implications:

Perspective: How to Save the Pakistan Relationship Marvin Weinbaum, October 17, 2006

Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan
Mohsen Milani (Spring 2006)

Since 1979, Iran’s objectives in Afghanistan have changed as Afghanistan’s domestic landscape changed. Still, Iran has consistently sought to see a stable and independent Afghanistan, with Herat as a buffer zone and with a Tehran-friendly government in Kabul, a government that reflects the rich ethnic diversity of the country. Toward those and other goals, Iran has created “spheres of influence” inside Afghanistan. During the Soviet occupation (1979-88), Iran created an “ideological sphere of influence” by empowering the Shi‘ites. Iran then created a “political sphere of influence” by unifying the Dari/Persian-speaking minorities, who ascended to power. Iranian policies added fuel to the ferocious civil war in the 1990s. Astonishingly slow to recognize the threat posed by the Taliban, Iran helped create a “sphere of resistance” to counter the “Kabul-Islamabad-Riyadh” axis by supporting the Northern Alliance. Since the liberation of Afghanistan, Iran has also established an “economic sphere of influence” by engaging in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Today, Iran’s goals are to pressure the Afghan government to distance itself from Washington, and for Iran to become the hub for the transit of goods and services between the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, Central Asia, India, and China. While Iran has been guilty of extremism and adventurism in some critical aspects of its foreign policy, its overall Afghan policy has contributed more to moderation and stability than to extremism and instability.

Perspective: Don't Shortchange Afghanistan Again
Karl Inderfurth, S. Frederick Starr, and Marvin Weinbaum
January 24, 2006

Transcript: The Afghan National Assembly: The Political Dimension
Marvin Weinbaum, December 13, 2005

Ethnicity and Civil Society in Contemporary Afghanistan
Carol J. Riphenburg (Winter 2005)

This article focuses on the critical question of ethnicity and politics in Afghanistan. It examines current conceptual models of ethnicity and their application to present-day political affairs in the country. Research shows that it is not the presence of ethnic groups per se that leads to violence or instability but the absence of civil society and democratic governance and norms. Lessons may be drawn from Afghanistan’s neighbors to the north. These Central Asian nations present cases of emerging civil societies, which are fragile, fragmented, and strongly influenced by the international donor community. After 23 years of war in Afghanistan, repression and neglect have had a devastating effect on civil society.

Military Rule, Islamism, and Democracy in Pakistan
Vali Nasr (Spring 2004)

Pakistan’s politics has been shaped by the dynamics of civilian-military relations and Islamism’s relation to the state. This has created an ongoing negotiation for power in which the military, civilian politicians, and Islamist forces have individually and in alliance with one another vied for control of Pakistan’s politics. General Pervez Musharraf’s regime has been no exception to this trend. As its claim to secular military rule proved untenable, it has turned to rely on Islamist forces to manage civilian-military relations.