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Algeria's Parliamentary Elections: Another Perspective

 
MEI Commentary
Algeria's Parliamentary Elections: Another Perspective
June 11, 2002
H.E. Idriss Jazairy

Readers of MEI’s recent Perspective: “Algeria’s Parliamentary Elections: Lessons for US Policy in the Arab World,” by Scholar in Residence Bradford Dillman, may be interested to read the following response by Ambassador Idriss Jazairy of Algeria. MEI does not take institutional positions on the substance of policy issues, but we do have a tradition of facilitating honest dialogue between the United States and the Middle East. We welcome Ambassador Jazairy's engagement in this important discussion.

In his paper entitled: "Algeria's Parliamentary Elections: Lessons for US Policy in the Arab World", published June 7, 2002 by the Middle East Institute, Mr. Bradford Dillman depicts a somber picture of Algeria that does not reflect reality and which in my view lacks fairness and insight. He indicated that the results of Algeria's May 30th parliamentary elections should be cause for concern in Washington in regard to the 47% national turnout at the polls.

This relatively low turnout can be explained by the fact that the majority of the Kabylia region's population was prevented from voting by extremists who resorted to threats and violence. Had people in the Kabylia region not been prevented forcefully by these extremists from accessing the voting booths, the turnout overall would have been at least 60%, which is not unusual in democracies. Mr. Dillman should have noticed that no neutral observer questioned the validity of the results, and that in itself is a success for the country and for President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who exercised his leadership to ensure free, democratic and transparent elections.

As far as Algeria is concerned, stereotypes persist stubbornly. In the heydays of the one-party system, the high rate of voter participation, exceeding 95%, was criticized as indicating fraud. Now realistic rates of voter participation of the electorate, which are similar to those of the last U.S. Presidential election (51%), are considered by Mr. Dillman as being, in Algeria's case only, a cause for concern. This is a no-win situation.

Of course we hope that future elections will have higher turnouts as those Algerians who are still skeptical see that democracy really works. It's probably the first time we've had such transparent elections. Surely, Mr. Dillman should have expressed concern, not with the democratic path on which President Bouteflika has staked his credibility, but with the way militants resorted to violence in Kabylia to prevent people from voting.

As for the low participation of voters in Algiers, this is a traditional feature of the electorate when there is no tampering with the votes. Abstention rates are usually lower in the smaller cities and in the countryside. This situation is not specific to Algeria.

Mr. Dillman indicates that these elections took place after ten years of severe civil conflict, omitting to mention that local (1997), parliamentary (1997) and presidential (1995) elections and a referendum (1999) were held during this period. He may recall that, in a speech on March 14, 2002, at the Middle East Institute, he himself spoke about a level of dynamism in Algeria, citing as examples "animated public debates on political issues and a vibrant private press" – signs that can hardly be attributable to "one of the most repressive regimes in the Arab World" as he puts it in his latest paper.

In writing, "the failure of Algeria to make strides toward democracy is undermining the country's long-term stability," he seems to ignore the efforts made by Algerians at all levels and their progress towards democracy as demonstrated by the recent elections which indeed open a new era in multi-party parliamentary democracy. Nobody in Algeria would disagree on the magnitude of the remaining challenges faced by the Government in fully implementing the structural reforms that are at a crucial stage. These reforms aim at laying the foundations for a modern state governed by the rule of law, the respect of fundamental liberties and promoting an efficient market economy and a performing educational system. In choosing to ignore these efforts, Mr. Dillman is doing a disservice to all progressive forces in the country and is discouraging them from continuing to make the hard choices of tough political, economic and social reforms.

Mr. Dillman raises the issue, settled long ago, of the banned Islamic Salvation Front and states that these elections failed to rehabilitate it, as though this question is the pressing issue of the moment or one of the desirable objectives of these elections. He does not mention that this movement was outlawed by a decision of justice after it called for an all-out war on the Republic, its institutions, the Algerian people and on all foreigners living in the country. The author of the article seems to advocate the rehabilitation of this organization, whose terrorist outgrowths are responsible for the national tragedy from which Algeria has fortunately emerged, but not without paying a heavy price in terms of losses of human lives. All spheres of the Algerian society, and not just the Army, were united to prevent the emergence of another Taliban Afghanistan on the shores of the Mediterranean.

I should have expected Mr. Dillman to have a better understanding of what his implicit advocacy of power-sharing with al-Qaeda-trained terrorist groups in Algeria would imply after the U.S. itself were exposed to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

It is worth indicating that three Islamic parties are represented in this new Parliament and their combined seats will make them the second force in the Algerian political spectrum, with 92 seats out of a total of 389. These elections also witnessed the rise of the left-wing Workers Party, which won 21 seats. As for the rejuvenated National Liberation Front, it won 199 seats and therefore the majority of the Parliament, far ahead of the National Rassemblement for Democracy (48 seats). These results suggest that Algeria has a real pluralist Parliament in which the most divergent political thoughts are represented.

The Berber or Amazigh heritage of Algeria was also addressed in the paper but in an incomplete, if not distorted, manner. It should be mentioned that President Abdelaziz Bouteflika took, on May 12th, 2002, a historic decision to constitutionalize the Amazigh language, elevating it to the rank of national language. He emphasized that he was not responding to a claim of one region in particular but to a demand that concerns all parts of the country which share the same cultural and linguistic heritage. It is also worth indicating that the Amazigh language was already been introduced in school and university curriculums several years ago.

President Bouteflika said on a number of occasions that Algeria has nothing to hide. He rejected the accusations leveled against the security forces and considered them as part of a campaign to discredit the military institution and to destabilize it. As the first elected, civilian head of state, President Bouteflika demonstrated that he and not the military, that Mr. Dillman refers to as the real power holders, is exercising in transparency and with authority the responsibilities of his high office.

Many independent observers, including Americans, recognize the emergence in Algeria of a real multi-party system, a market economy – although the process of privatization continues to be slow – and a free and vibrant civil society with close to 60,000 NGOs. The process toward reaching the ultimate objectives of a full democracy will be strewn with difficulties, but the will exists to insure that these will be overcome at all cost until the objectives are reached. That should be encouraged, not discouraged or belittled.

H.E. Idriss Jazairy is the Algerian Ambassador to the United States of America.

Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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