This article focuses on the economic dimension of Israeli policy towards the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. The article argues that since 1967, both before and after the Oslo process, Israeli policy was directed at preventing the “Two,” i.e. the division of the land into two states and two economic (and political) sovereign entities, while also negating the “One,” i.e. the establishment of a single political and economic entity. Although Israeli policy repudiated both the “Two” and the “One,” it changed character and formulations from time to time.

This article examines the factors that may lead previously radical and militant Islamist movements to de-radicalize, and in so doing alter their ideologies, strategies, and objectives. In particular it will focus on the process of de-radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group, a former ally of al-Qa‘ida. It will conclude with a tentative framework explaining the causes behind de-radicalization as well as policy recommendations.

For decades, the regional order in the Gulf was shaped by a triangle formed by Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. If one of them gained too much weight, the other two tried to compensate. Yet the 2003 Iraq War has created an entirely new situation since the indefinite US presence has virtually transformed the triangle into a square. Yet in reality this impression is misleading because Iraq’s role has actually been usurped by the United States. This has resulted in a new, artificial triangle comprised of the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

This study reports on attitudes of a sample of 474 college-educated Kuwaiti citizens towards violence against women. Four constructs were examined, namely: 1) social aspects of violence against women; 2) socio-economic status/educational aspects of violence against women; 3) preventive indicators of violence against women and; 4) physical aspects of violence against women. Evidence regarding the reliability and validity of the instrument designed to measure the four outcome measures are reported.

Following the Suez War, Israel defined any interference with its freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran as a casus belli. Despite acceptance by the international community, Egypt’s opposed position remained intact. Hence, to prevent the reoccurrence of war, a complex set of tacit understandings and arrangements was reached between the opponents during 1957.

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