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The ‘Shiite crescent’ has become a popular intellectual shortcut in media and policy circles to explain Muslim affairs. Yet, it is a flawed theory that ignores the complexity of religious, national, local and tribal allegiances that include, exclude or overlap each other in the Middle East. It does not account for a number of factors including the occasional inter-Shiite fighting in Iraq. In an interesting twist, two Shiites – Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – happen to be the most popular leaders in overwhelmingly Sunni Egypt (and probably most of the Middle East) according to a poll conducted by the Ibn Khaldun Center in Cairo. So much for Sunni-Shiite mutual hatred. This theory may be inadequate and over-inflated, but it refers to a real problem of rising tension between Sunnis and Shiites in areas throughout the Middle East.

One crucial but under-discussed arena of Sunni-Shiite relations is Saudi Arabia. Approximately 10 percent of the Kingdom’s population is reported to be Shiite. Since the Kingdom’s establishment in 1932, Shiite rituals have been subjected to significant constraints and Shiites have been marginalised and intermittently repressed. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have all pointed out the systematic social, political, religious and economic discrimination of Shiites by Saudi state institutions and ulama (clergy). Since 1993, Saudi rulers have attempted some rapprochement by engaging Shiite leaders, although significant advances have yet to materialise.

Sunni-Shiite relations in Saudi Arabia are important for the rest of the Muslim world. Indeed, the Kingdom’s religious establishment often adheres to a puritanical and intolerant version of Sunni Islam and holds sway over many radical Muslim circles thanks to its worldwide network of mosques. As a result, the Saudi ulama bear much responsibility in the propagation of anti-Shiite feelings, but they are also in a strategic position to soothe tensions between the two communities. A radical break with well-established anti-Shiism is unlikely; observers of the Kingdom know that its inhibited culture and desire for total consensus makes Switzerland look like a fast-changing country.

However, there are two reasons to believe that the time is ripe for bold action. First, despite the slight détente in the Kingdom in the 1990’s, tensions have been mounting since the advent of civil war in Iraq and the reassertion of Iranian and Hezbollah influence, increasing alarm about regional Shiite domination. Many young Saudis who engage in jihad in Iraq are motivated inter alia by fervent anti-Shiite sentiments. This heated situation has also engendered an increase in despicable acts of vandalism such as cemetery profanation and the torching of Shiite mosques, threatening the inter-communal status quo.

Secondly, Saudi King Abdullah is investing much hope in his calls for interfaith dialogue. Earlier this month he concluded an interfaith conference in Madrid, which he hopes to be the first step in a sustained dialogue process. Christian and Jewish religious authorities worldwide have been involved and many declared their support for the King’s overture. It is quite an undertaking for the leader of a country that constrains or bans any non-Islamic religious act, sign or place of worship and he has attracted much attention. The legitimacy and credibility of the King’s move will, to a large extent, depend on the state of Sunni-Shiite relations within the Kingdom.

Recent moves indicate that the King is aware of this situation and wants to make advances, even at the price of infuriating some members of the ulama. Twenty two radical Saudi clerics issued a religious edict (fatwa) this month saying that Hezbollah’s fight against Israel in Lebanon is actually a disguise to conceal the movement’s anti-Sunni agenda. They proclaimed that Shiites followed ‘infidel precepts’. Reaction was swift: Mohammed al-Nujaimi, a prominent member of the religious establishment and a cleric one wouldn’t exactly call ‘liberal’, was dispatched last week to mend fences with the Shiites. He met with the leader of the Shiite community, Hassan al-Saffar, and other representatives to condemn the edict. There is good reason to believe that the King was behind this effort. By Saudi standards this is a bold move, as the rulers of the Kingdom are always wary of antagonizing the ulama, who provide them with legitimacy. Anti-Shiite sentiment is one of the main tenets of the ulama’s Wahabbi ideology and the King’s overture is unlikely to be appreciated.

There is good reason to be sceptical about the outcome of the King’s outreach to the Shiite community, but mounting tensions and the King’s interfaith projects have created a state of affairs in which the Saudi Shiite situation cannot be shunned any longer. If a decent modus vivendi is worked out, it can have some impact on Sunni-Shiite relations worldwide thanks to the Kingdom’s special position within the Islamic world, and can reassert the House of Saud over an obscurantist and anachronistic ulama. Inshallah.