American objectives in Lebanon are clear, reasonable and honorable. The United States wants an independent, democratic Lebanon free from foreign interference, particularly from Syria and Iran. It also wants a prosperous Lebanon at peace with its neighbors, including Israel.
The question is why have these fair and reasonable goals been so difficult to attain? There is no single answer, but what is clear is that the United States does not understand the long-term political changes taking place in Lebanon and how they interfere with American objectives. Most important among these changes is the increasing influence of the Lebanese Shia community, which necessitates a redistribution of power within the Lebanese government.
At the time of its founding, the diversity of the Lebanese population was unique in the Arab world. In particular, the large Christian population made Lebanon the only Christian-dominated Arab state. Instruments of power were divided between Christians and Muslims with the preponderance of power resting with the Christians. The President, the army commander and a majority in parliament were Christian. The Muslims, however, had sufficient levers of power to prevent the government from taking actions inimical to their interests. The Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, usually the head of the internal security forces, and a blocking minority in Parliament were Muslim. In this way, Christian control was assured, but Muslim interests were protected.
By the mid-1970’s, demographic shifts and changing regional politics created a rift between the actual division of power and political reality. The original political compact no longer represented the interests of all. After 15 years of civil war, the 1989 Taif agreement codified a new distribution of power. As painful as this was to the dominant Christian community, peace could not have come without the acceptance of a new political reality – equality between Muslims and Christians.
In the 18 years since Taif, demographic and regional political circumstances have again created a rift between the division of power and political reality. The crucial imbalance of power this time is not between Muslim and Christian, but between Sunni and Shia. Since the founding of the state, the Sunnis have dominated Muslim politics just as the Christians dominated national politics before Taif. Over time, the demographic and political balance has shifted in favor of the Shia, but no corresponding shift in the distribution of power within the government has occurred. If peace and normalcy are to return to Lebanon, Shia interests must be protected within the executive branch.
Each community – Christian, Sunni, and Shia – must be assured that the government will not and cannot make decisions against its vital interests. Under the current situation, the Shia do not have this protection. Christians and Sunnis have the power to block any government action, but the Shia do not. Christians control the Presidency, command the army, and have a blocking vote in Parliament and the Cabinet. Similarly, the Sunnis appoint the Prime Minister, command the internal security forces, and have a blocking vote in Parliament and the Cabinet. In comparison, the Shia have no controlling position in the Lebanese executive branch, and they, therefore, must rely on the Speaker of the Parliament and their militia to protect the community’s interest.
The current crisis began in late 2006 when all Shia Cabinet members resigned their posts terminating the ruling consensus. They thought that without a consensus, the government would have to reconstitute itself and thus address their concerns. However, the decision was made to continue governing without them, which highlighted the Shia’s inability to protect their own interests within the executive branch. Having the limited powers of the Speaker of Parliament as their only recourse, many Shia turned to their primary source of strength outside the government – Hezbollah – for leadership and protection.
The dominance of Hezbollah within the Lebanese Shia community is likely to continue so long as the Shia do not have the power within the government to prevent the government from taking actions against their interests. A lasting solution to the current crisis is not likely unless the Shia are afforded the same protection from government mistreatment that the Christians and Sunnis enjoy. In the short term, affording them a blocking third – 11 of 30 members – in the Cabinet would appear to be the only way the Shia could protect their interests from inside the executive branch of government.
Many argue that the Shia community should not be given “veto” power over government policies, out of fear of increasing the influence of Hezbollah. In fact the opposite is likely to be true. Empowerment of the Shia community would allow a wider diversity of views and over time would diminish the influence of Hezbollah. Until the Shia are guaranteed that the Lebanese government cannot act against their interests, in the same way it cannot act against Christian and Sunni interests, they will protect themselves by looking outside the government and obstructing the governing process. Under such circumstances, the influence of Hezbollah is likely to increase.
If the American goal of a free, democratic, peaceful and prosperous Lebanon and a diminished role for Hezbollah is to be achieved, then, as a prerequisite, the Lebanese Shia community needs a guarantee that the government of Lebanon cannot act without Shia concurrence. Each of the three principal communities—Christian, Sunni and Shia—needs this guarantee. A failure to equal protection to the Shia is likely to lead to greater instability and the strengthening of Hezbollah.
Graeme Bannerman is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute. He runs his own international consulting firm and is a former Staff Director for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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American objectives in Lebanon are clear, reasonable and honorable. The United States wants an independent, democratic Lebanon free from foreign interference, particularly from Syria and Iran. It also wants a prosperous Lebanon at peace with its neighbors, including Israel.
The question is why have these fair and reasonable goals been so difficult to attain? There is no single answer, but what is clear is that the United States does not understand the long-term political changes taking place in Lebanon and how they interfere with American objectives. Most important among these changes is the increasing influence of the Lebanese Shia community, which necessitates a redistribution of power within the Lebanese government.
At the time of its founding, the diversity of the Lebanese population was unique in the Arab world. In particular, the large Christian population made Lebanon the only Christian-dominated Arab state. Instruments of power were divided between Christians and Muslims with the preponderance of power resting with the Christians. The President, the army commander and a majority in parliament were Christian. The Muslims, however, had sufficient levers of power to prevent the government from taking actions inimical to their interests. The Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, usually the head of the internal security forces, and a blocking minority in Parliament were Muslim. In this way, Christian control was assured, but Muslim interests were protected.
By the mid-1970’s, demographic shifts and changing regional politics created a rift between the actual division of power and political reality. The original political compact no longer represented the interests of all. After 15 years of civil war, the 1989 Taif agreement codified a new distribution of power. As painful as this was to the dominant Christian community, peace could not have come without the acceptance of a new political reality – equality between Muslims and Christians.
In the 18 years since Taif, demographic and regional political circumstances have again created a rift between the division of power and political reality. The crucial imbalance of power this time is not between Muslim and Christian, but between Sunni and Shia. Since the founding of the state, the Sunnis have dominated Muslim politics just as the Christians dominated national politics before Taif. Over time, the demographic and political balance has shifted in favor of the Shia, but no corresponding shift in the distribution of power within the government has occurred. If peace and normalcy are to return to Lebanon, Shia interests must be protected within the executive branch.
Each community – Christian, Sunni, and Shia – must be assured that the government will not and cannot make decisions against its vital interests. Under the current situation, the Shia do not have this protection. Christians and Sunnis have the power to block any government action, but the Shia do not. Christians control the Presidency, command the army, and have a blocking vote in Parliament and the Cabinet. Similarly, the Sunnis appoint the Prime Minister, command the internal security forces, and have a blocking vote in Parliament and the Cabinet. In comparison, the Shia have no controlling position in the Lebanese executive branch, and they, therefore, must rely on the Speaker of the Parliament and their militia to protect the community’s interest.
The current crisis began in late 2006 when all Shia Cabinet members resigned their posts terminating the ruling consensus. They thought that without a consensus, the government would have to reconstitute itself and thus address their concerns. However, the decision was made to continue governing without them, which highlighted the Shia’s inability to protect their own interests within the executive branch. Having the limited powers of the Speaker of Parliament as their only recourse, many Shia turned to their primary source of strength outside the government – Hezbollah – for leadership and protection.
The dominance of Hezbollah within the Lebanese Shia community is likely to continue so long as the Shia do not have the power within the government to prevent the government from taking actions against their interests. A lasting solution to the current crisis is not likely unless the Shia are afforded the same protection from government mistreatment that the Christians and Sunnis enjoy. In the short term, affording them a blocking third – 11 of 30 members – in the Cabinet would appear to be the only way the Shia could protect their interests from inside the executive branch of government.
Many argue that the Shia community should not be given “veto” power over government policies, out of fear of increasing the influence of Hezbollah. In fact the opposite is likely to be true. Empowerment of the Shia community would allow a wider diversity of views and over time would diminish the influence of Hezbollah. Until the Shia are guaranteed that the Lebanese government cannot act against their interests, in the same way it cannot act against Christian and Sunni interests, they will protect themselves by looking outside the government and obstructing the governing process. Under such circumstances, the influence of Hezbollah is likely to increase.
If the American goal of a free, democratic, peaceful and prosperous Lebanon and a diminished role for Hezbollah is to be achieved, then, as a prerequisite, the Lebanese Shia community needs a guarantee that the government of Lebanon cannot act without Shia concurrence. Each of the three principal communities—Christian, Sunni and Shia—needs this guarantee. A failure to equal protection to the Shia is likely to lead to greater instability and the strengthening of Hezbollah.
Graeme Bannerman is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute. He runs his own international consulting firm and is a former Staff Director for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.