The crisis over attacks into Turkey from Iraq by elements of the militant Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) highlights another example of problematic Iraqi Kurdish behavior. In several respects, Iraqi Kurdish leaders have acted in ways that potentially jeopardize Kurdish interests, not only with respect to the current face-off with the Turks, but internal Iraqi issues as well.
The two parties ruling the bulk of Iraq's Kurds have put Iraqi Kurdistan on a rather independent and risky course . Actions related to the quasi-independence of areas controlled by their Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), such as flying the KRG flag from public buildings instead of the Iraqi flag and holding a referendum on independence, have increased suspicions in all quarters. Even teaching Arabic in Kurdish schools virtually ceased when Iraq’s Kurdish region gained a measure of autonomy during 1991-2003, so most Kurds under the age of 25 no longer speak Arabic, further isolating their region from the rest of Iraq.
To the extent Iraqi Kurds drift in the direction of quasi-independence, the more Turkey with its large Kurdish minority becomes alarmed. And should the KRG engage in any mistreatment of the large Iraqi Turcoman population in territory under its control or in additional areas claimed by the KRG in the future, the greater will be the popular pressure in Turkey to deal more harshly with Iraq’s Kurds.
When it comes to the PKK presence in northern Iraq, the Turks (and the US) know the KRG has done very little to crack down on lethal PKK cross-border attacks, despite considerable knowledge about where PKK fighters, training areas and safe-havens are located. PKK attacks recently have killed dozens of Turkish soldiers.
Although there have been promises by the KRG to help suppress the PKK, Iraqi Kurds are unlikely to deliver in ways that could end the current crisis quickly and definitively. One problem is the reluctance on the part of their own Kurdish fighters to attack fellow Kurds, especially the PKK’s fanatical and battle-hardened cadres. As a result, Turkish
talks with President Bush, Secretary Rice and other efforts aimed at addressing the Turkish-PKK mess may well fail to defuse the crisis because of a lack of meaningful Iraqi Kurdish follow-through.
In an Iraqi context, the Kurds have laid claim to areas far beyond the current KRG area of control. Kurdish claims relating to oil-rich Kirkuk steal the headlines, but separate claims extend well beyond the Kirkuk area. Large Sunni Arab populations would be affected should these areas come under KRG control. As a result, Kurdish actions to consolidate
their hold on Kirkuk, coupled with additional claims, have increased tensions between Iraq’s Kurds and Sunni Arabs. That makes greater ethno-sectarian strife in northern Iraq more likely in the future.
Many assume that even in a worst case Iraqi civil war scenario, the Kurds would have oil exports to sustain themselves while Sunni Arabs would not. This is questionable. It is not just a topographical issue. Various governments in Baghdad—all the way back to the
monarchy—did not trust the Kurds, so export pipelines from the Kirkuk oil fields do not run directly to the Turkish border through Kurdish-controlled territory. Instead, they run through the largely Sunni Arab flatlands of north-central Iraq and then northwest through
predominantly Sunni Arab and Turcoman areas to the Turkish border. In any Kurdish-Sunni Arab confrontation, these pipelines almost certainly would be put out of action.
Given what is likely to remain somewhat provocative behavior by Iraqi Kurds, the US is best advised not to get involved in the Turkish-Kurdish problem along the Iraqi border in a way that might put the US awkwardly in the middle between Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey.
With that in mind, there has long been talk of establishing permanent US bases in the KRG zone. This should be avoided. Iraq’s Kurds almost certainly would exploit such a situation to act even more boldly, hoping to use any US presence as a shield of sorts.
The highest priority must be given to repairing and preserving US relations with Turkey—our only NATO ally in the Middle East. Despite past differences with the Turks over Iraq and other issues, Turkish cooperation is vital to the aerial re-supply of US forces in Iraq. It also is critical to sustaining vital military operations centered on
Incirlik airbase in southeastern Turkey, where over 1,000 US military personnel are stationed. As Washington works through the current crisis, it must bear in mind broader US regional interests.
Wayne White is an Adjunct Scholar with the Middle East Institute. Previously, he was Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research Office of Analysis for the Near East, with a special focus on Iraq.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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The crisis over attacks into Turkey from Iraq by elements of the militant Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) highlights another example of problematic Iraqi Kurdish behavior. In several respects, Iraqi Kurdish leaders have acted in ways that potentially jeopardize Kurdish interests, not only with respect to the current face-off with the Turks, but internal Iraqi issues as well.
The two parties ruling the bulk of Iraq's Kurds have put Iraqi Kurdistan on a rather independent and risky course . Actions related to the quasi-independence of areas controlled by their Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), such as flying the KRG flag from public buildings instead of the Iraqi flag and holding a referendum on independence, have increased suspicions in all quarters. Even teaching Arabic in Kurdish schools virtually ceased when Iraq’s Kurdish region gained a measure of autonomy during 1991-2003, so most Kurds under the age of 25 no longer speak Arabic, further isolating their region from the rest of Iraq.
To the extent Iraqi Kurds drift in the direction of quasi-independence, the more Turkey with its large Kurdish minority becomes alarmed. And should the KRG engage in any mistreatment of the large Iraqi Turcoman population in territory under its control or in additional areas claimed by the KRG in the future, the greater will be the popular pressure in Turkey to deal more harshly with Iraq’s Kurds.
When it comes to the PKK presence in northern Iraq, the Turks (and the US) know the KRG has done very little to crack down on lethal PKK cross-border attacks, despite considerable knowledge about where PKK fighters, training areas and safe-havens are located. PKK attacks recently have killed dozens of Turkish soldiers.
Although there have been promises by the KRG to help suppress the PKK, Iraqi Kurds are unlikely to deliver in ways that could end the current crisis quickly and definitively. One problem is the reluctance on the part of their own Kurdish fighters to attack fellow Kurds, especially the PKK’s fanatical and battle-hardened cadres. As a result, Turkish
talks with President Bush, Secretary Rice and other efforts aimed at addressing the Turkish-PKK mess may well fail to defuse the crisis because of a lack of meaningful Iraqi Kurdish follow-through.
In an Iraqi context, the Kurds have laid claim to areas far beyond the current KRG area of control. Kurdish claims relating to oil-rich Kirkuk steal the headlines, but separate claims extend well beyond the Kirkuk area. Large Sunni Arab populations would be affected should these areas come under KRG control. As a result, Kurdish actions to consolidate
their hold on Kirkuk, coupled with additional claims, have increased tensions between Iraq’s Kurds and Sunni Arabs. That makes greater ethno-sectarian strife in northern Iraq more likely in the future.
Many assume that even in a worst case Iraqi civil war scenario, the Kurds would have oil exports to sustain themselves while Sunni Arabs would not. This is questionable. It is not just a topographical issue. Various governments in Baghdad—all the way back to the
monarchy—did not trust the Kurds, so export pipelines from the Kirkuk oil fields do not run directly to the Turkish border through Kurdish-controlled territory. Instead, they run through the largely Sunni Arab flatlands of north-central Iraq and then northwest through
predominantly Sunni Arab and Turcoman areas to the Turkish border. In any Kurdish-Sunni Arab confrontation, these pipelines almost certainly would be put out of action.
Given what is likely to remain somewhat provocative behavior by Iraqi Kurds, the US is best advised not to get involved in the Turkish-Kurdish problem along the Iraqi border in a way that might put the US awkwardly in the middle between Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey.
With that in mind, there has long been talk of establishing permanent US bases in the KRG zone. This should be avoided. Iraq’s Kurds almost certainly would exploit such a situation to act even more boldly, hoping to use any US presence as a shield of sorts.
The highest priority must be given to repairing and preserving US relations with Turkey—our only NATO ally in the Middle East. Despite past differences with the Turks over Iraq and other issues, Turkish cooperation is vital to the aerial re-supply of US forces in Iraq. It also is critical to sustaining vital military operations centered on
Incirlik airbase in southeastern Turkey, where over 1,000 US military personnel are stationed. As Washington works through the current crisis, it must bear in mind broader US regional interests.
Wayne White is an Adjunct Scholar with the Middle East Institute. Previously, he was Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research Office of Analysis for the Near East, with a special focus on Iraq.