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Iraqi militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr remains a force to be reckoned with, regardless of his recent reverses. Unlike other militia leaders, he is more charismatic and has a large popular street following in locations extending from Baghdad through Iraq’s heavily populated Shi’a south. Ever since the surge, Sadr has been waiting out Washington, biding his time until the balance of political and street power is more to his liking.

To many outside observers, this seemingly moody and much maligned young cleric might seem a spent force in Iraqi politics, with his Mahdi Army worn down by lopsided combat with more capable US forces. However, those who have brokered the latest shaky ceasefire between the Mahdi Army on the one hand and Iraqi government and US forces on the other doubtless know better. Sadr has a powerful name and considerable charisma among Iraq’s Shi’a downtrodden. He also reportedly has been studying in Qom to burnish his clerical credentials.

Clumsy US counterinsurgency tactics in the early years of the Iraq War generated as many-—if not more--insurgent recruits as those fighters killed or captured. Likewise, in the recent fighting in Sadr City, during which US forces did much of the heavy lifting, numerous casualties among civilians and extensive property damage probably rallied many angry Shi’a to Sadr’s cause.

Sadr and his Mahdi Army may be the only Shi’a militia on the Iraqi scene with real street power. Following the example of other Islamist groups in the region, he is expanding that base by endeavoring to provide Iraqi Shi’a with some of the basic medical, educational and social services Iraq’s dysfunctional central government has been unable to deliver. Sadr certainly is not popular everywhere within Iraq’s majority Shi’a community, but has large followings in areas such as East Baghdad, al-Amarah, al-Kut, portions of Basrah, etc.

Many Iraqis, including poorer Shi’a, are tired of the violence associated with efforts by the Mahdi Army to secure control of additional areas and take on US and government forces, as well as abuses on the part of some Mahdi Army cadres. Yet, there have been no firm indications that his support base has weakened significantly. Indeed, to many Shi’a, Sadr’s fierce anti-Americanism and opposition to “occupation” still resonate very strongly.

Much has been made of Sadr’s acceptance of considerable support from Iran. However, Sadr’s principal rival, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his “Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council” (SIIC), which recently has cozied up to the government of Prime Minister Maliki and Washington, also receives assistance from Iran.

Unlike al-Hakim and many of his supporters however, the Sadr clan did not set up shop in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War or flee Iraq during the worst of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny. They stayed and often defied Saddam, resulting in the murder of Muqtada’s influential father, Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr in 1999, Muqtada’s two brothers, as well as his famous father-in-law in 1980. That, combined with Muqtada’s strong nationalist message, makes Sadr’s ties to Iran less controversial than otherwise might have been the case.

Muqtada al-Sadr also is his own man. In part for this very reason, Iran withheld support from him in 2003. Efforts to stereotype Sadr, especially among non-Iraqis, as an Iranian client who progressively can be peeled away from his Iraqi constituency reflect a profound misunderstanding and underestimation of Sadr’s overall clout in many quarters.

Sadr largely has been playing a waiting game since the beginning of the surge. His anti-American agenda apparently has not changed but he knows he currently is outmatched. Yet, neither the US nor the Maliki government can destroy Sadr’s power without removing the grievances of the many Shi’a who support him. Since the government has shown little ability to deliver, and one major grievance is the US occupation itself, Sadr—-or someone very much like Sadr if something should happen to him—probably will remain a robust fixture on the Iraqi political scene for some time to come.