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Iranian foreign policy is shaped by two factors: an acute sense of insecurity and a thirst for international recognition. Insecurity is largely the result of the country’s immediate geostrategic situation. Indeed Iran’s natural habitat – characterized by an abnormally high level of interstate tensions and transnational violence – poses major security challenges to the country’s policymakers.

To the east, there is Pakistan, an unstable military dictatorship with nuclear capability, and the failed state of Afghanistan, now home to a hostile American military presence. There is instability to the north with a recently crushed independence struggle in Chechnya, guerrilla warfare in Dagestan, and still unresolved conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as between Georgians and Ossetians. The former superpower Russia seems to be on Iran’s side but is ultimately unpredictable and therefore unreliable. Iran’s western border is shared with Iraq, with which it fought one of the longest interstate conflicts of the 20th century and which is now also home to an American military presence. Last but not least is a nuclear capable Israel, which boasts the region’s most powerful military and regularly calls for the Iranian issue to be dealt with ‘by any means’.

This is not intended to dismiss Iran’s responsibility in antagonising some of these nations, particularly Israel. Rather, its purpose is to underscore that the Iranians’ sense of insecurity is real and justified. This is especially true when considering that throughout the 20th century Iran has regularly been the object of incursions or invasions (most notably by the Allies in 1941 and Iraq in 1980).

Iran’s thirst for recognition is a direct consequence of the country’s nationalist posture. This has deep historical roots in past Russo-British interferences into the country’s internal political affairs and exploitation of economic resources. After the United States replaced Russia and Britain as Iran’s main imperialist challenge, it gave its hand to the removal of democratically-minded Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953 and subsequently supported and armed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s royal dictatorship.
The significance of this traumatic encounter with the West cannot be sufficiently stressed, and its impact on foreign policy cannot be overstated. It is continuously discussed in public and private circles, effectively reopening old wounds. The most radical form of Iranian nationalism can be understood as a collective post-traumatic condition, which is revived by vivid flashbacks and reinforced by fresh evidence of the outside world’s perceived ill-feelings towards Iran.

Iranian nationalism is based on the belief that while Iran is by all standards a powerful country, it is prevented from assuming its place on the world stage by perennial American, British and Israeli opposition. Iran is a populous, culturally sophisticated, nationally cohesive and - by the standards of the developing world – technologically advanced country. How else can a policymaker in Tehran explain why Israel, India and Pakistan have been allowed to develop nuclear arsenals without much international outrage while Iran is ostracized for its own program, so far carried out within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weaponry is an obvious response to these concerns. First, it would give Iran some security guarantees and would preclude outside attempts at regime change. Second, the prestige surrounding the possession of nuclear technology is believed in Iran to be a necessary step in the country’s quest for international recognition.

With this in mind, it becomes clear why four years of pressure, isolation, subtle threats and serial embargos have so far failed to weaken the Islamic Republic’s resolve. They have in fact had the opposite effect by intensifying security concerns and reinforcing the belief that Iran is being denied what its neighbours already possess. The need for a nuclear deterrent is thus rendered even more pressing in the Iranian point of view.

The alternative to the current trend of threats and embargoes is engagement by the West. This does not come with a guarantee of success but it must be attempted since isolation and non-engagement have been unsuccessful. The 2006 proposal made by the EU 3 (France, Britain and Germany) gave some vague assurances about regional security schemes and normalisation, which is a start.
However, if viewed from Tehran’s perspective it is difficult to believe in Washington’s good faith when it still refuses to talk unconditionally to Iran. There was some flesh to former President Mohammad Khatami’s opening toward Washington, as it helped provide the Pentagon with crucial intelligence on the Taliban ahead of the invasion of Afghanistan, only to have Iran included in the ‘Axis of Evil’ a few weeks later. This episode confirmed the belief among some Iranians that it is Washington that cannot be engaged.
The gradual and infinitely dangerous empowerment of the Islamic Revolution’s Guards Corps (IRGC), the impunity with which Ahmadinejad acts despite his very poor domestic performance, the retour en force of hard-line rhetoric, and the new repressive measures against dissidents are all justified using the excuse of an ‘American threat’. If the United States is sincere in its wish to see a more moderate regime in Tehran, the best policy would be to eliminate that pretext and throw all its weight into negotiations over Iran’s nuclear file and establish direct negotiation channels. If engagement fails, then the blame can indisputably be laid on Iran’s door. But if it succeeds, apart from the tangible benefits of an improved regional security situation, this could also encourage a more moderate Iranian government. History has shown that engagement can moderate.