The breach of the border barrier along the Gaza-Egyptian border presents Egypt with a major quandary. Egypt is caught between several fires, mostly not of its own making, and with few good options clearly available. President Husni Mubarak has made a virtue of necessity by indicating he welcomed the influx of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into Sinai, but in fact this prospect has long raised major concerns in Egypt about the potential of chaos in Gaza. Egypt would prefer to revert to the status quo, but Hamas is eager to see an open border point at Rafah. The Palestinian Authority government of Mahmud ‘Abbas would like to use the border issue as leverage to regain influence in Gaza. Israel, meanwhile, is making sounds about getting out of the business of supplying electricity in Gaza now that “the border is open” with Egypt. And because of the likelihood of criticism from other Arab states, Egypt cannot be very open about its fundamental concerns.
Consider this: some press reports and the United Nations have suggested that as many as 700,000 Palestinians entered Egypt from Gaza in the first days after the border break-through. Even if that number is a gross exaggeration, 1.5 million people crowded into the 350 square kilometers of the Gaza strip outnumber the entire population of the Sinai Peninsula -- about half a million scattered over 60,000 square kilometers. Half a million or more Palestinians pouring into northeastern Sinai could easily overwhelm the limited population of northeastern Sinai.
Egypt’s ability to constrain is limited in part by the shortage of security forces. Egyptian regular military forces are banned from the eastern Sinai (“Area C”) under the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The exception is an amendment agreed by the Israeli Knesset in 2005 to allow 750 Egyptian border guards (not regular Army) along the border once Israel withdrew completely from Gaza. There are reports that Egypt sent an additional 5,000 border guards in 2006, in part in response to Israeli complaints about arms smuggling and smuggling tunnels along the border.
Egypt is still prohibited from using its regular armed forces in any strength in eastern Sinai but the Egyptians are seriously concerned about: Egyptian’s view of Hamas. While Egypt has at times sought to facilitate negotiations between Hamas and Fatah, it has undeniably seen the Hamas takeover of Gaza last June as a potential threat. Hamas, after all, evolved directly out of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, itself was originally founded under the tutelage of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The Egyptian government sees the Brotherhood as its most potent domestic threat. It is no coincidence that Egypt’s chief negotiator with Israel and the Palestinian Authority on security affairs is General Omar Suleiman, the country’s Director of General Intelligence.
The flood of pro-Hamas Palestinians into northern Sinai is likely interpreted by the Egyptian security establishment as a direct threat to Egypt’s internal security. The demographic facts on the ground reinforce this. The shortage of security forces undermines the security forces’ ability to respond. When Hamas took over last year in Gaza, Egypt closed the border (Israel also closed its border crossing points to Egypt) and has characterized the Hamas takeover as an illegitimate coup. Although Egypt kept the border closed, the wall had been built by the Israelis before their withdrawal.
Egypt also is clearly worried about the Israeli effort to shift responsibility for Gaza Egypt, of course has many connections to Gaza. Under the terms of the armistice after the 1948 war Egypt administered Gaza from 1948 until 1967. Unlike Jordan, which annexed the West Bank, Egypt never claimed Gaza as part of Egypt and in fact kept it under a military governor until the 1967 war, with Gaza residents not readily permitted to enter Egypt. After the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, a number of personal and institutional ties across the border were resumed. But the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty affirmed that Egypt made no territorial claims beyond the international frontier. In fact, Egypt basically refused to consider any resumption of Egyptian Administration there precisely because of the demographic makeup of Gaza.
Israel was not that eager to remain in Gaza either: it promoted a “Gaza first” approach in the Oslo talks and, of course, withdrew its forces completely from Gaza in 2005. But there are some signs that Israel is leaning towards pressing Egypt to take responsibility for Gaza, something the Egyptians see as a disastrous course.
Immediately after the breach in the border took place, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai, a former general and member of the Labor Party, (Party leader Ehud Barak, is the defense minister), publicly suggested that now that the border with Egypt was open, Israel should get out of the role of supplying Gaza altogether. He told Army Radio that the disengagement process begun in 2005 “continues in that we want to stop supplying electricity to them, stop supplying them with water and medicine, so that it would come from another place. We are responsible for it as long as there is no alternative.”
Egypt rejected Vilnai’s remarks but there are few solutions to the present quandary that do not leave Egypt in a more awkward position. An open border at Rafah raises serious security concerns in Sinai. A closed border guarantees that Egypt will be portrayed as allied with Israel to besiege Gaza. A deal with the Palestinian Authority rather than Hamas, to take over the border crossing raises huge problems of implementation.
If Egypt accepts more responsibility for Gaza along the lines Vilnai has suggested, Israel could hold it responsible for the next round of Qassam rocket attacks on Israeli towns. And yet the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty prohibits Egypt from moving major military forces in to enforce order. This surely is not a choice Egypt wants.
Michael Dunn is Editor of the Middle East Journal. He has taught at various US universities, including Georgetown University and Utah State University.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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The breach of the border barrier along the Gaza-Egyptian border presents Egypt with a major quandary. Egypt is caught between several fires, mostly not of its own making, and with few good options clearly available. President Husni Mubarak has made a virtue of necessity by indicating he welcomed the influx of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into Sinai, but in fact this prospect has long raised major concerns in Egypt about the potential of chaos in Gaza. Egypt would prefer to revert to the status quo, but Hamas is eager to see an open border point at Rafah. The Palestinian Authority government of Mahmud ‘Abbas would like to use the border issue as leverage to regain influence in Gaza. Israel, meanwhile, is making sounds about getting out of the business of supplying electricity in Gaza now that “the border is open” with Egypt. And because of the likelihood of criticism from other Arab states, Egypt cannot be very open about its fundamental concerns.
Consider this: some press reports and the United Nations have suggested that as many as 700,000 Palestinians entered Egypt from Gaza in the first days after the border break-through. Even if that number is a gross exaggeration, 1.5 million people crowded into the 350 square kilometers of the Gaza strip outnumber the entire population of the Sinai Peninsula -- about half a million scattered over 60,000 square kilometers. Half a million or more Palestinians pouring into northeastern Sinai could easily overwhelm the limited population of northeastern Sinai.
Egypt’s ability to constrain is limited in part by the shortage of security forces. Egyptian regular military forces are banned from the eastern Sinai (“Area C”) under the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The exception is an amendment agreed by the Israeli Knesset in 2005 to allow 750 Egyptian border guards (not regular Army) along the border once Israel withdrew completely from Gaza. There are reports that Egypt sent an additional 5,000 border guards in 2006, in part in response to Israeli complaints about arms smuggling and smuggling tunnels along the border.
Egypt is still prohibited from using its regular armed forces in any strength in eastern Sinai but the Egyptians are seriously concerned about: Egyptian’s view of Hamas. While Egypt has at times sought to facilitate negotiations between Hamas and Fatah, it has undeniably seen the Hamas takeover of Gaza last June as a potential threat. Hamas, after all, evolved directly out of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, itself was originally founded under the tutelage of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The Egyptian government sees the Brotherhood as its most potent domestic threat. It is no coincidence that Egypt’s chief negotiator with Israel and the Palestinian Authority on security affairs is General Omar Suleiman, the country’s Director of General Intelligence.
The flood of pro-Hamas Palestinians into northern Sinai is likely interpreted by the Egyptian security establishment as a direct threat to Egypt’s internal security. The demographic facts on the ground reinforce this. The shortage of security forces undermines the security forces’ ability to respond. When Hamas took over last year in Gaza, Egypt closed the border (Israel also closed its border crossing points to Egypt) and has characterized the Hamas takeover as an illegitimate coup. Although Egypt kept the border closed, the wall had been built by the Israelis before their withdrawal.
Egypt also is clearly worried about the Israeli effort to shift responsibility for Gaza Egypt, of course has many connections to Gaza. Under the terms of the armistice after the 1948 war Egypt administered Gaza from 1948 until 1967. Unlike Jordan, which annexed the West Bank, Egypt never claimed Gaza as part of Egypt and in fact kept it under a military governor until the 1967 war, with Gaza residents not readily permitted to enter Egypt. After the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, a number of personal and institutional ties across the border were resumed. But the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty affirmed that Egypt made no territorial claims beyond the international frontier. In fact, Egypt basically refused to consider any resumption of Egyptian Administration there precisely because of the demographic makeup of Gaza.
Israel was not that eager to remain in Gaza either: it promoted a “Gaza first” approach in the Oslo talks and, of course, withdrew its forces completely from Gaza in 2005. But there are some signs that Israel is leaning towards pressing Egypt to take responsibility for Gaza, something the Egyptians see as a disastrous course.
Immediately after the breach in the border took place, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai, a former general and member of the Labor Party, (Party leader Ehud Barak, is the defense minister), publicly suggested that now that the border with Egypt was open, Israel should get out of the role of supplying Gaza altogether. He told Army Radio that the disengagement process begun in 2005 “continues in that we want to stop supplying electricity to them, stop supplying them with water and medicine, so that it would come from another place. We are responsible for it as long as there is no alternative.”
Egypt rejected Vilnai’s remarks but there are few solutions to the present quandary that do not leave Egypt in a more awkward position. An open border at Rafah raises serious security concerns in Sinai. A closed border guarantees that Egypt will be portrayed as allied with Israel to besiege Gaza. A deal with the Palestinian Authority rather than Hamas, to take over the border crossing raises huge problems of implementation.
If Egypt accepts more responsibility for Gaza along the lines Vilnai has suggested, Israel could hold it responsible for the next round of Qassam rocket attacks on Israeli towns. And yet the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty prohibits Egypt from moving major military forces in to enforce order. This surely is not a choice Egypt wants.
Michael Dunn is Editor of the Middle East Journal. He has taught at various US universities, including Georgetown University and Utah State University.