Violence finally has declined enough so that an atmosphere more conducive to deal-making has emerged for Iraq’s rival ethno-sectarian groups. However, so far the tenor of politics in Baghdad does not appear to have changed much. Washington must make clear to the Iraqi government that as the surge begins to wind down, the opportunity to set in place durable stability must not be squandered. Otherwise, all involved will pay the consequences.
Violence certainly persists, but much of Iraq is safer than it was a year ago. Outside Baghdad, this has had relatively little to do with the surge. The main driver has been a Sunni Arab uprising against brutal and abusive Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) cadres that had been operating out of many Sunni Arab communities.
However, the alliance of convenience between many Sunni Arab tribal and insurgent elements on the one hand and US forces on the other against AQI reportedly has permitted 60,000 to 70,000 Sunni Arabs, with considerable hostility toward the Iraqi government, to arm and organize themselves as never before. Most of these Sunni Arabs in fact only agreed to this arrangement with US forces when Washington dropped its condition that there could be no such cooperation unless these elements also made their peace with the government in Baghdad.
Meanwhile, in stabilizing much of Baghdad, US forces did not succeed in crushing the Shi’a militias and their death squads, most notably Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. In the face of the surge, such militias largely refused battle, either keeping a low profile in their Baghdad strongholds or fleeing to southern Iraq, generally beyond the reach of US forces.
Nonetheless, since their organization remains intact, these armed Shi’a militiamen would be free to return to Baghdad and resume their grisly activities once the surge winds down. In the meantime, Sadr has reined in his forces, but such a move could merely represent a clever tactical pause.
The first withdrawals aimed at bringing overall US troop levels down to pre-surge levels are going to come from Sunni Arab areas from which AQI has been driven. To the extent this becomes a trend, more and more Sunni Arab areas would fall under the control of what Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki recently called “illegal militias” - the armed Sunni Arab forces organized locally with US encouragement since late 2006.
If Sunni Arabs, Shi’a and Iraqi Kurds have not worked out the bulk of their differences by the time the surge winds down next summer, there would not be enough US forces to prevent tens of thousands of Sunni Arab fighters from coming into direct contact with government security forces and Shi’a militias, possibly resulting in a bloodbath.
Unfortunately, the only real political progress to date in Iraq has been the submission of legislation to Parliament that would allow hundreds of thousands of former Ba’th Party members to return to Iraqi political life. This proposed measure has, however, already reportedly run into considerable resistance.
Some argue that achieving certain formal political goals related to reconciliation, such as a revenue-sharing agreement, is unimportant because some ad hoc progress along such lines has been made. This is misleading. If such cooperation is not formalized, deep suspicions would persist, especially among Iraq’s alienated Sunni Arabs, who probably fear that such cooperation could be ended later rather arbitrarily.
A sense of urgency must be impressed upon Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurds. These two groups dominate the current political process and should offer meaningful concessions to Iraq’s increasingly formidable Sunni Arabs in order to break out of this dangerous pattern of gridlock regarding the building blocks for trust and reconciliation.
The current downturn in violence is fragile. It is very risky to crush one insurgency (AQI) by allowing another far more deeply-rooted insurgency to arm and organize. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs must be drawn into the political mainstream before the surge runs its course. If not, violence could rebound, even closer to levels akin to civil war than that seen in 2006. Only by including all of Iraq's ethno-sectarian communities in their country's future can there be a promising future for a united Iraq.
Wayne White is an Adjunct Scholar with the Middle East Institute. He is a former Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research Office of Analysis for Near East
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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Violence finally has declined enough so that an atmosphere more conducive to deal-making has emerged for Iraq’s rival ethno-sectarian groups. However, so far the tenor of politics in Baghdad does not appear to have changed much. Washington must make clear to the Iraqi government that as the surge begins to wind down, the opportunity to set in place durable stability must not be squandered. Otherwise, all involved will pay the consequences.
Violence certainly persists, but much of Iraq is safer than it was a year ago. Outside Baghdad, this has had relatively little to do with the surge. The main driver has been a Sunni Arab uprising against brutal and abusive Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) cadres that had been operating out of many Sunni Arab communities.
However, the alliance of convenience between many Sunni Arab tribal and insurgent elements on the one hand and US forces on the other against AQI reportedly has permitted 60,000 to 70,000 Sunni Arabs, with considerable hostility toward the Iraqi government, to arm and organize themselves as never before. Most of these Sunni Arabs in fact only agreed to this arrangement with US forces when Washington dropped its condition that there could be no such cooperation unless these elements also made their peace with the government in Baghdad.
Meanwhile, in stabilizing much of Baghdad, US forces did not succeed in crushing the Shi’a militias and their death squads, most notably Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. In the face of the surge, such militias largely refused battle, either keeping a low profile in their Baghdad strongholds or fleeing to southern Iraq, generally beyond the reach of US forces.
Nonetheless, since their organization remains intact, these armed Shi’a militiamen would be free to return to Baghdad and resume their grisly activities once the surge winds down. In the meantime, Sadr has reined in his forces, but such a move could merely represent a clever tactical pause.
The first withdrawals aimed at bringing overall US troop levels down to pre-surge levels are going to come from Sunni Arab areas from which AQI has been driven. To the extent this becomes a trend, more and more Sunni Arab areas would fall under the control of what Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki recently called “illegal militias” - the armed Sunni Arab forces organized locally with US encouragement since late 2006.
If Sunni Arabs, Shi’a and Iraqi Kurds have not worked out the bulk of their differences by the time the surge winds down next summer, there would not be enough US forces to prevent tens of thousands of Sunni Arab fighters from coming into direct contact with government security forces and Shi’a militias, possibly resulting in a bloodbath.
Unfortunately, the only real political progress to date in Iraq has been the submission of legislation to Parliament that would allow hundreds of thousands of former Ba’th Party members to return to Iraqi political life. This proposed measure has, however, already reportedly run into considerable resistance.
Some argue that achieving certain formal political goals related to reconciliation, such as a revenue-sharing agreement, is unimportant because some ad hoc progress along such lines has been made. This is misleading. If such cooperation is not formalized, deep suspicions would persist, especially among Iraq’s alienated Sunni Arabs, who probably fear that such cooperation could be ended later rather arbitrarily.
A sense of urgency must be impressed upon Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurds. These two groups dominate the current political process and should offer meaningful concessions to Iraq’s increasingly formidable Sunni Arabs in order to break out of this dangerous pattern of gridlock regarding the building blocks for trust and reconciliation.
The current downturn in violence is fragile. It is very risky to crush one insurgency (AQI) by allowing another far more deeply-rooted insurgency to arm and organize. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs must be drawn into the political mainstream before the surge runs its course. If not, violence could rebound, even closer to levels akin to civil war than that seen in 2006. Only by including all of Iraq's ethno-sectarian communities in their country's future can there be a promising future for a united Iraq.
Wayne White is an Adjunct Scholar with the Middle East Institute. He is a former Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research Office of Analysis for Near East