The process of restoring full and normal US-Libyan relations has been slow and painful. The official visit of Libyan Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Shalgham in January was long anticipated. He had met with Secretary Rice twice and was hoping for news about a long awaited visit by Rice to Libya.
This did not happen, despite previous public statements that she wanted to visit Tripoli. The reasons are unclear, but they doubtless range from problems of the Secretary’s crowded schedule to continued obstacles in the Congress to a normal US diplomatic presence in Tripoli, something that US allies in Europe and other major countries have enjoyed for years.
Various members of Congress have promoted legislation that would tie normalization of relations to full satisfaction of claims against Libya by US victims of terrorism. This remains the case despite the Libyan willingness to deal with such matters through legal channels, including the payment of $8 million each to the families of those who died in the destruction of Pan Am flight 103.
Passage of a defense authorization bill that encourages US plaintiffs to attach Libyan assets in the United States has led the Libyan Government to halt considering investments of any part of its financial reserves in US capital markets. Many private US companies view the legislation as a clear threat to interests they may hold now or in the future in partnership with Libyan state companies or other entities.
Unlike their foreign competitors, only a small number of US companies have returned to Libya after the lifting of economic sanctions. They complain of limited US visa services available to Libya and other handicaps in competing for Libyan business with the companies of other countries whose governments provide full diplomatic facilities and high-level support.
US companies stand to benefit from a rapidly growing market fueled by high oil prices and Libya’s development projects aimed at ending Libya’s isolation from globalization and repairing a neglected infrastructure. But they are hesitant to take any risks while official relations continue to appear fragile.
US – Libyan relations have been marked by war at the beginning of the 19th century, US engagement in the development of Libya’s oil wealth and human resources in the mid 20th century, Libyan terrorism and US military retaliation, followed by economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation in the late 20th century, and long periods of either neglect or animosity.
Starting in 1992, Libya took initiatives for secret talks with Britain and the US to improve relations. By December 2003, all three parties were ready to go public with results that formalized changes in Libyan behavior and opened up the prospect of a new era of mutually beneficial ties in the 21st century. The Libyan government took steps to end support for terrorism and announced it would give up its chemical and nuclear weapons programs.
The international community, including the UN and the US, responded with step- by-step measures to reward good Libyan behavior and take advantage of the possibilities for resumed economic ties and new forms of security cooperation. The incentive for Libya has been full normalization of relations with all of the governments of Europe and other major governments around the world. That happened rather quickly after the suspension of UN sanctions in the late 1990s, with the sole exception of the United States,
Muammar Qadhafi’s highly personal and difficult to predict leadership is reason for caution. Since the turn of the century, however, his directives have been the most reality-based and promising of more than three decades in power.
Internationally, he seeks acceptance by the West and integration into the global system. He is moving his country toward global economic integration and buying or attracting private companies representing the best in modern technology and management.
Qadhafi also responded well to the new international realities of September 2001. Libya was among the first Muslim governments to condemn the attacks of September 11 and to offer assistance to the American people. Intelligence exchanges on matters of mutual interest regarding Islamist terrorist groups gained new impetus. Libyan officials claim they were ahead of the US in drawing attention to the dangers opposed by Usama Bin Laden. Libyan policies toward Africa, which were very troubling in the past, have become on the whole positive in both the economic and political spheres.
US oil companies returned to the market after sanctions were lifted a year ago and are now in a position to share in the oil and gas developments of a country with considerable potential for growth. But, no US cabinet official has visited the country. Influential members of Congress are blocking the assignment to Libya of a full US Ambassador. Legislation threatens to interrupt the promising but still nascent commercial cooperation between US firms and the Libyan government.
There is no denying that Libya is ruled by a dictator given to often startling announcements, despite his more prudent and predictable behavior in recent years. But the principal reason for diplomatic relations is not to celebrate our friendships with ideal democracies with free market economies. The more beneficial diplomatic challenge is to transform countries from adversaries to partners in dealing with a world of global threats to all of us.
David Mack is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute. During his diplomatic career as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and as US Ambassador to the UAE. His earlier assignments included Libya.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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The process of restoring full and normal US-Libyan relations has been slow and painful. The official visit of Libyan Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Shalgham in January was long anticipated. He had met with Secretary Rice twice and was hoping for news about a long awaited visit by Rice to Libya.
This did not happen, despite previous public statements that she wanted to visit Tripoli. The reasons are unclear, but they doubtless range from problems of the Secretary’s crowded schedule to continued obstacles in the Congress to a normal US diplomatic presence in Tripoli, something that US allies in Europe and other major countries have enjoyed for years.
Various members of Congress have promoted legislation that would tie normalization of relations to full satisfaction of claims against Libya by US victims of terrorism. This remains the case despite the Libyan willingness to deal with such matters through legal channels, including the payment of $8 million each to the families of those who died in the destruction of Pan Am flight 103.
Passage of a defense authorization bill that encourages US plaintiffs to attach Libyan assets in the United States has led the Libyan Government to halt considering investments of any part of its financial reserves in US capital markets. Many private US companies view the legislation as a clear threat to interests they may hold now or in the future in partnership with Libyan state companies or other entities.
Unlike their foreign competitors, only a small number of US companies have returned to Libya after the lifting of economic sanctions. They complain of limited US visa services available to Libya and other handicaps in competing for Libyan business with the companies of other countries whose governments provide full diplomatic facilities and high-level support.
US companies stand to benefit from a rapidly growing market fueled by high oil prices and Libya’s development projects aimed at ending Libya’s isolation from globalization and repairing a neglected infrastructure. But they are hesitant to take any risks while official relations continue to appear fragile.
US – Libyan relations have been marked by war at the beginning of the 19th century, US engagement in the development of Libya’s oil wealth and human resources in the mid 20th century, Libyan terrorism and US military retaliation, followed by economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation in the late 20th century, and long periods of either neglect or animosity.
Starting in 1992, Libya took initiatives for secret talks with Britain and the US to improve relations. By December 2003, all three parties were ready to go public with results that formalized changes in Libyan behavior and opened up the prospect of a new era of mutually beneficial ties in the 21st century. The Libyan government took steps to end support for terrorism and announced it would give up its chemical and nuclear weapons programs.
The international community, including the UN and the US, responded with step- by-step measures to reward good Libyan behavior and take advantage of the possibilities for resumed economic ties and new forms of security cooperation. The incentive for Libya has been full normalization of relations with all of the governments of Europe and other major governments around the world. That happened rather quickly after the suspension of UN sanctions in the late 1990s, with the sole exception of the United States,
Muammar Qadhafi’s highly personal and difficult to predict leadership is reason for caution. Since the turn of the century, however, his directives have been the most reality-based and promising of more than three decades in power.
Internationally, he seeks acceptance by the West and integration into the global system. He is moving his country toward global economic integration and buying or attracting private companies representing the best in modern technology and management.
Qadhafi also responded well to the new international realities of September 2001. Libya was among the first Muslim governments to condemn the attacks of September 11 and to offer assistance to the American people. Intelligence exchanges on matters of mutual interest regarding Islamist terrorist groups gained new impetus. Libyan officials claim they were ahead of the US in drawing attention to the dangers opposed by Usama Bin Laden. Libyan policies toward Africa, which were very troubling in the past, have become on the whole positive in both the economic and political spheres.
US oil companies returned to the market after sanctions were lifted a year ago and are now in a position to share in the oil and gas developments of a country with considerable potential for growth. But, no US cabinet official has visited the country. Influential members of Congress are blocking the assignment to Libya of a full US Ambassador. Legislation threatens to interrupt the promising but still nascent commercial cooperation between US firms and the Libyan government.
There is no denying that Libya is ruled by a dictator given to often startling announcements, despite his more prudent and predictable behavior in recent years. But the principal reason for diplomatic relations is not to celebrate our friendships with ideal democracies with free market economies. The more beneficial diplomatic challenge is to transform countries from adversaries to partners in dealing with a world of global threats to all of us.
David Mack is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute. During his diplomatic career as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and as US Ambassador to the UAE. His earlier assignments included Libya.