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Post-War Status of Lebanon's March 14th Movement

 
Event Summary
Post-War Status of Lebanon's March 14th Movement
September 21, 2006

Event Featuring:

Musbah al-Ahdab, Member of Parliament, Lebanon

Overview

MP Musbah al-Ahdab's comments focused on the status of the March 14th pro-democracy movement, as well as the future prospects for Lebanon following the July 12 crisis. In his briefing, he described the different elements of Lebanese society and their unified response to the conflict. In addition, he listed four challenges the Siniora government faces in order to sustain the March 14th movement: reconstruction in a clear and transparent manner, inclusion of the Shiite population, implementation of UN Res. 1701, and an international tribunal on the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

Event Summary

The March 14th demonstrations that followed the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri engendered hope for Lebanon. In what was dubbed the “Cedar Revolution,” hundreds of thousands of Lebanese took to the streets and called for an end to Syrian influence. Syria ceded to the pressure and withdrew its 14,000 military and intelligence personnel on April 27, 2005. The March 14th alliance created a new reformist political coalition that swept into power in the following elections.

Despite the success of the movement, Lebanon remains divided into two tracks. The first track is what is now known as the March 14th alliance. In addition to opposing Syrian influence, its agenda includes the construction of state institutions, rebuilding the economy, emphasizing Lebanese sovereignty, and building immunity to the regional conflicts that have long permeated Lebanese society.

The second track is comprised of the Hizbullah movement and the pro-Syrians. MP al-Ahdab argued that their agenda is to merely maintain Lebanon as a proxy battlefield for the Arab-Israeli conflict and as a staging ground for Syrian and Iranian agendas.

In describing these two tracks, al-Ahdab stressed that unlike Iraq, Lebanese politics do not fall exclusively along sectarian lines. Instead, Lebanese society is divided between the two movements and this split is cross-confessional: not all Shi’a support Hizbullah, nor are all Sunnis and Christians opposed to Hizbullah. Despite these cross-confessional and sectarian differences, Lebanese society became unified in its response to the July 12, 2006 conflict.

Although Iran and Israel may have been aware of the oncoming hostilities in the summer of 2006, al-Ahdab insisted that the Lebanese people, who would suffer the brunt of the conflict, were taken completely by surprise. After the onset of hostilities, the Lebanese government immediately distanced itself from the kidnapping and led diplomatic efforts in order to end the crisis. As a part of these efforts, Prime Minister Siniora put forward the Seven-Point Initiative at the Rome conference. Its components included the reimplementation of UNIFIL forces in the south and a return to the 1949 ceasefire. In spite of these efforts, the conflict ensued until August 14, claiming the lives of over 1,000 Lebanese civilians, 163 Israelis, and an unknown number of Hizbullah militants.

MP al-Ahdab contended that despite Hizbullah’s claims to victory, the July war negatively affected both tracks. Hizbullah was forced to accept the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) on southern soil for the first time since 1968. Additionally, the deployment of a stronger UNIFIL force with a stronger mandate will limit Hizbullah’s militant actions. The March 14th movement also was affected, as damage to the economy and infrastructure severely hindered development and reform.

According to al-Ahdab, there are four challenges the Siniora government must undertake in order to rebuild Lebanon and sustain the March 14th movement:

1) Implementation of Res. 1701
While acknowledging that both movements were hurt by the July 12 war, al-Ahdab asserted that the drafting and implementation of Resolution 1701 has in fact bolstered the March 14th movement. The resolution’s measures limit the development of Hizbullah as a militia and guarantee the deployment of LAF and UNIFIL forces to extend Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanese territory. The language of the resolution gives the exclusivie possession of weapons to the Lebanese government, which would consolidate power in the democratically elected government. The Siniora government must sufficiently arm the LAF and garner international support for a successful implementation of Res. 1701.

2) Reconstruction in a clear and transparent manner
The national unity following the July 12 crisis gave an historic opportunity for the Lebanese government to confront challenges that have plagued the nation for decades: poverty, reconstruction, and political reform. In order to regain the support of disaffected segments of the population, reconstruction and reform must take place in a clear and transparent manner. This task is dependent upon the implementation of Res. 1701, as any further destabilization will render reform impossible.

3) Inclusion of the Shiite population
The largest challenge for the Siniora government is the reconsideration of Shiite participation. MP al-Ahdab reiterated that Hizbullah should no longer be the exclusive representative of the Shiite community, and that it is essential for other Shiite politicians to have a chance to exist in the political sphere.

Many Shi’a initially joined the March 14th opposition with the intention of forming a structured Lebanon and taking part in the central legal institutions. According to al-Ahdab, the dialogue between the March 14th Alliance and Hizbullah excluded those moderate Shi’as and further alienated the Shiite community. The March 14th alliance must present a platform to accommodate progressive leaders of the Shiite population in order to provide an alternative to Hizbullah, and to produce a truly representative Lebanese movement.

4) Hariri tribunal
MP al-Ahdab insisted that an international tribunal for the assassination of Rafiq Hariri is a critical component in reconstruction. The tribunal would be an essential step towards countering the policy of political assassinations as a form of intimidation. The lives of many prominent MPs, including himself, remain under constant threat. As long as this violent intimidation is allowed to continue, Lebanese society will be neither open nor free.

Despite the recent conflict and its intrinsic obstacles to reconstruction and reform, MP al-Ahdab remained optimistic about Lebanon’s future. If the Siniora government and the March 14th alliance successfully undertake these challenges, stability and transparent democratic institutions will return to Lebanon. He also warned that any power vacuum would provide an opportunity for Syrian influence to return. In his opinion, aid and support from the international community to the Lebanese government is crucial in preventing such a regression from occurring.

About this Event

Speaker Details

MP Musbah al-Ahdab was first elected to the Lebanese Parliament in 1996, and sits on the Finance and Budget Committees. Even before the assassination of the late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, MP al-Ahdab was an outspoken advocate of achieving Lebanese sovereignty, arguing that democracy cannot take root in Lebanon until all regional actors stop interfering with Lebanon's internal situation. A progressive Sunni Muslim from Tripoli, a traditionally conservative Sunni city, MP al-Ahdab works tirelessly to rally all segments of Lebanese society around supporting reform and democracy for Lebanon. He began his third parliamentary term in 2005.

Attributions

Taylor Luck prepared this event summary. Taylor is a senior at Beloit College, majoring in international relations with a focus in the Middle East. He is currently an intern in the Communications Department of the Middle East Institute. Isaac Morrison peer-edited this summary. He is also an intern at the Middle East Institute.

Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Summary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.