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President George W. Bush has made it clear that he will not accept a nuclear-armed Iran. Nor will he take the military option off the table. It would have been far more precise if the president had said that he would not accept a nuclear-armed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Does anyone seriously believe that if a government friendly to the United States were sitting in Tehran the president would be threatening war to stop its enrichment program? Even if such a government went further to develop nuclear weapons, there is no reason to believe the United States would use military force to stop it any more than it did in Pakistan. What we are really talking about, insofar as the Bush Administration or powerful people within it are concerned, is regime change. It does make a difference whose finger is on the trigger.

There are grounds for concern about a nuclear-armed Iran under any circumstances. It would tend to further erode the international non-proliferation regime. It might trigger other states in the region to follow suit. It would enhance Iran’s political power in the region, particularly in relation to its oil-rich neighbors. It would also strengthen Iran’s voice in OPEC, although at this point the traditional Iranian position as a price hawk is moot, given rising international demand. None of these effects would merit US military action.

But if you believe — as President Bush evidently does — that the current Iranian regime is inherently evil, or if you see the regime as aggressively seeking to undermine the Gulf states, as many in the administration do, by supporting Shiite ascendancy, spreading the message of its brand of theocracy, and standing in the way of our efforts to install democracy in Iraq and throughout the region, then it stands to reason that a regime of this nature would have far greater capacity to achieve these ends given the influence and power that would accrue from having nuclear weapons.

I think we underestimate President Bush’s personal commitment to the spread of democracy as his legacy to the world. He seems to have a religious commitment to democracy as a safeguard against evil, an answer to war, and a response to terrorism. I suspect that many people discount his statements as rhetorical flourishes or domestic politics. But he seems to me to be a true believer. If that is indeed the case, then George W. Bush will not leave office while Khamenei still has the capacity to develop and deploy nuclear weapons.

The president is talking about using diplomacy to stop the Iranian program. But based on the conversations I heard about diplomacy and Iraq in the administration’s earliest days, there are still those around the president who believe, as they did then, that recourse to the Security Council or efforts to obtain an effective sanctions regime are dangerous paths to follow because they might work — that is, they might make it virtually impossible to resort to military action, while at the same time have little or no effect on an Iranian regime committed to joining the nuclear club. Saddam Hussein survived over ten years of draconian sanctions without changing his policies. What makes us think Khamenei is any less committed, particularly when the vast majority of Iranians support the nuclear program, largely as a matter of national pride?

If the president were serious about diplomacy, he would not paint himself into a rhetorical corner as he has done or take steps such as direct talks off the table. In fact, the president has added a new component to the cost of backing away from confrontation, and that is US “credibility.” This is the administration that came to office believing the United States had squandered its credibility in Lebanon, Somalia and Bosnia. It is not likely to commit the same perceived error of “fecklessness” or “weakness” in the face of the possible costs of a military solution to Iran.

Of course the president is not the only one painting himself into a corner. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is doing a pretty good job of making any kind of diplomatic or political solution untenable. In effect, what we have now is a game of international chicken between these two presidents, with the increasing likelihood that neither man can afford to turn the wheel. The resulting collision will have significant implications for Iran, the United States, the region, and possibly the world, from what would likely be a long-term asymmetrical war between the United States and Iran.

Anyone who thinks Iran will accept a US attack on its nuclear potential doesn’t read history. Iran proved its staying power in the Iran-Iraq War. It has weapons at hand, a nationalistic and proud population capable of enduring pain and hardship and willing to do so in the face of foreign attack, a well-oiled covert capability, and loyal, or at least well paid, adherents in Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian areas, and elsewhere throughout Shiite communities in the Middle East and the world. Add to these advantages a geographical position that allows it to tighten the oil spigot by attacking transshipment through the Gulf, as it did in the tanker war during the Iran-Iraq War or by covertly attacking the oil facilities of its neighbors. Finally, it has borders and influence in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the US is vulnerable to Iranian incitement.

Hopefully, there is still time to back away from confrontation. But it will not happen so long as Ahmadinejad believes the United States would be crazy to attack given our tenuous situation in Iraq and increasingly problematic position in Afghanistan. Obviously, Ahmadinejad has not talked to the neoconservative ideologue who told me before we invaded Iraq that the important thing was to “break the mold” and then the world would have to cope with the aftermath. Someone has to flinch in this game of chicken. For better or worse it is not likely to be our president.