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Paul Pillar began by highlighting pre-Iraq War intelligence assessments about the challenges that the US and future Iraqi government would face after the fall of Saddam Husayn. Pillar emphasized that, in making those assessments in early 2003, CIA analysts did not try to predict future events that hinged largely on future US policies. Rather, intelligence officers focused on the analysis of the history, geography, culture, and demographics of Iraq in order to determine what challenges the US and its allies would likely face after the invasion. Chief among these was the building of a stable, representative government in a country with a long history of authoritarianism. However, many analysts felt that, even with proper planning and near perfect execution, Operation Iraqi Freedom was a “fool’s errand” that had little chance of achieving its goals.

Pillar said he believed that Iraqi democracy could be achieved, and pointed out that it took about 800 years for the Anglo-American world to develop its democratic political systems. Iraq today, he said, “in some ways is closer to the Magna Carta than it is to the here and now.” Yet, intelligence analysts believed there were three reasons for optimism: First, Husayn had “given authoritarianism a bad name” and his egregious excesses made the development of an alternative government attractive; second, an estimated four million well-educated, skilled Iraqi exiles have returned to Iraq eager to help rebuild their country; and third, political Islam is a relatively weak force in Iraqi culture. These positives, however, did not distract the analysts from making an overriding, two-part assessment: first, that whoever was in charge in post-Saddam Iraq would be left to manage a society deeply divided by sectarian and ethnic strife between Sunnis (whose privileged position had been lost), Shiites (who would likely be eager to right the wrongs done to them under Saddam) and Kurds (whose desire for autonomy or independence coincided with control over large amounts of Iraq's oil wealth), and second, that the potential for violence could only be controlled by the presence of an occupying force.

What the intelligence team found was that the only way to avoid such violence and maintain a positive attitude among the populace towards the occupying forces was to put Iraq on a quick road to recovery with Marshall Plan-scale investment financed by oil wealth, and to provide basic services to the people. This did not happen, largely because of post-war insurgent violence that destroyed large amounts of infrastructure, which led to the current failing security situation.

Analysts never seriously hoped that Iraq would serve as a linchpin for a democratic transformation of the Middle East, although Pillar did stress that the eventual emergence of a stable, functional, Shia-dominated state could serve as counterpoint to the vilayat-e-faqih (State of the Jurist) regime in Iran. What intelligence officers did find likely was that the war would boost the popularity of extremist groups and produce a magnet effect whereby Iraq would attract the attention of extremists throughout the region, which has come to fruition in personalities like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

As far as the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that dominated pre-war debate, Pillar said that all assessments done by analysts showed that a post-Saddam Iraq was still likely to pursue a WMD program based on threats from Iran, Israel, and others. Pillar also said that pre-war assessments did not indicate that the Iraq War would be a deterrent to WMD production in other countries in the region, but that the example of the invasion of Iraq under such pretexts would only increase the speed with which such programs were developed.

In his final comments, Pillar stressed that the future of Iraq is in the hands of the Iraqi statesmen who are working to suppress sectarian tensions and craft Iraq's first truly representative government, as well as the US and its citizens whose domestic policies will ultimately effect Iraq in numerous ways.