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The strain on relations between Syria and the United States has greatly reduced Syrian President Bashar Assad’s ability to pacify US demands on Syria through strategic concessions. Bashar’s growing realization that he will be left “naked in front of the US” if he keeps “taking off his clothes” has prompted the Syrian leader to resist increasing US pressure on Syria.

According to Landis, US policy-makers do not have the means to impose hard, hawkish policies, but they also lack political justifications for soft, accommodative policies. As America’s influence on Bashar’s government weakens, Landis said that obtaining Lebanon’s support would be the only opportunity for the US to clampdown on Syria. But Bashar is gambling on the presumption that US-led democratization attempts will fail in Lebanon, and that the country will remain under Syria’s influence.

Landis argued that US rhetoric about Bashar’s alleged weakening is a misreading of his position and emphasized Bashar’s increasing leverage in the Syrian political arena, as demonstrated by Bashar’s recent successful political purges. In his November 10, 2005 speech, Bashar presented his people with a choice: either Syrians must resist pro-American policies or suffer the chaotic consequences. Landis referred to his Internet blog (www.syriacomment.com), on which he noted that a continuation of Syrian concessions to US demands would result in another chapter of Sykes-Picot (a 1916 agreement that divided the Middle East into areas of European influence, giving the French control over modern Syria and Lebanon).

Although Syrians are well aware of corruption problems and their stagnant economy, Landis argued that Syrians are not prepared to sacrifice the stability ensured under Bashar’s regime for an experiment with democracy. The war in Iraq has decreased the capacity of the US to follow through on its threats to Syria, and the social fragmentation that resulted from the US intervention has bolstered Bashar’s legitimacy. Syrians do not want to see their country de-stabilized because they fear a splintered society and the potential consequence of it fueling a Kurdish independence movement. Landis listed poor economic conditions and increasing criminality as the only foreseeable means of convincing Syrians to support a pro-US agenda.

Lebanon was a political battleground for the old and new guard and a tool for Bashar to consolidate his power. Bashar faced a ring of powerful stalwarts linked to the old guard —Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam and former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri in particular — who obstructed the new Syrian ruler from gaining a decisive hold on Syrian and Lebanese politics. When diplomatic and economic forms of coercion failed, the Syrian leader was left with limited options to tilt the existing political balance in his favor, and thus Landis explained the logic behind Syria’s alleged assassination of Rafiq Hariri.

Khaddam’s political career in Syria came to a close at a June 2005 Ba’thist Party conference when the undercut politician resigned and fled to Paris. Khaddam is collaborating with the UN Security Council (UNSC) investigation into Hariri’s assassination, but Landis noted that Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s intervention behind the scenes at the UNSC to halt Bashar’s impending referral to the Council is a clear indication that Bashar’s power has consolidated considerably in the region.

Landis dismissed the possibility of a coup noting that a coup would likely be detected and would lack Syrian popular support even if it succeeded. Landis also noted the growing though unofficial presence of Syrian nationalism. Under Bashar, Syrian flags hang in replacement of faded posters of his father, Hafiz Assad. The social fragmentation in Iraq has contributed to a rise in Syrian nationalism, further bolstering Bashar’s legitimacy. As long as Bashar continues to resist international demands and maintain domestic tolerance for his regime, his power and leverage in the region will solidify.