Amid the intense discussion of victory and withdrawal, close examination of another oft-used term regarding Iraq is being neglected in many quarters. The word “Iraqis” was used repeatedly by President Bush in his November 30 address. Indeed, whether there are millions of Iraqis courageous enough to consider themselves Iraqis first and Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shi’a, etc. second may well mean the difference between success and failure.
Yet many millions of Iraqis do, in fact, appear to persist in viewing the politics of the new Iraq primarily through an ethno-sectarian lens. The road ahead for all involved is likely to be fraught with difficulty. Judging by the course of events so far, prospects do not appear all that promising for the broad-based emergence of a truly “Iraqi” identity — be it opinion maker or the proverbial man in the street.
Iraqi political figures associated with the three post-Saddam governments have proclaimed time and time again the need for their countrymen to view themselves as Iraqis first and turn away from the politics of ethno-sectarian identity. Yet, there is considerable doubt about whether even these leaders are ready to “walk the walk” or merely “talk the talk.”
Some actions on the part of these leaders clearly benefit Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurds at the expense of Sunni Arabs. Whether or not such measures are just is beside the point. They will doubtless help foster inter-communal animosity and mistrust.
Consequently, the broader political process so far has been strewn with evidence that when the chips are down, ethno-sectarian instincts largely trump a broader sense of Iraqi identity. In the north, the Kurds demand the expulsion of tens of thousands of Sunni Arabs from Kirkuk, in what is clearly a zero-sum game. In Sunni Arab areas of the country, the vast majority voted against a constitution apparently viewed as enshrining Shi’a-Kurdish rule. And in both the north and the south, Kurds and Shi’a want to gain more exclusive access to the oil resources underneath them.
In a more ominous manifestation of things to come, Sunni Arab and Shi’a hit squads, the latter perhaps exploiting their new-found dominance over the Ministry of Interior and the police, reportedly have been carrying out extensive campaigns of assassination. Widespread acts of brutality on both sides, coupled with threats, are beginning to drive Sunnis out of Shi’a neighborhoods and vice-versa. It seems, along with events in Kirkuk, like the beginning of a process of ethno-sectarian cleansing.
Meanwhile, if that were not enough, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s open campaign of anti-Shi’a massacre by car-bomb is generating pressure for a more forceful Shi’a retaliation. Similarly, the failure of Coalition and Iraqi government forces to decisively gain the upper hand over largely Sunni Arab insurgents and terrorists has drawn some Kurdish and Shi’a militia elements into the ongoing battle. It has also raised interest in even more wholesale militia involvement.
President Bush speaks of the Iraqi yearning for freedom and democracy. But in a country so heavily scarred by inter-communal bloodshed - much of it long predating the 2003 war and its aftermath — too many Sunni Arabs seem thoroughly disinterested in democracy. Many view democracy merely as a form of government that would transfer power to the majority Shi’a community and its Kurdish allies. Sunnis fear they will use their new-found power in a variety of ways to administer a certain measure of payback,aimed largely at the Sunni Arab community that ruled the country for so long.
One litmus test of whether a true “Iraqi” identity can prevail will be the future of the Iraqi military. The debate focuses on differences in the quality and pace of training and equipping Iraqi forces as well as questions about their state of readiness. But ultimately, a greater question looms: will that army hold together in times of crisis as a symbol and tool that promotes unity?
The results of the US effort to build a multi-confessional Lebanese army in 1982 raise real concerns about what might happen to its growing Iraqi counterpart — and the country it represents. Large portions of Lebanon’s military transformed themselves fairly quickly into extensions of ethnic and religious factions that perpetuated Lebanon’s civil war.
In Iraq, the final verdict is not yet in. Nonetheless, there are tendencies in the composition and use of the army that raise serious questions, not only about its own fate, but that of the country it is meant to serve and unify.
Wayne White is an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute. Before his retirement in 2005, he served as Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s Near Eastern Division and coordinated Iraqi Intelligence for INR.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
Related Resources
Countries
Amid the intense discussion of victory and withdrawal, close examination of another oft-used term regarding Iraq is being neglected in many quarters. The word “Iraqis” was used repeatedly by President Bush in his November 30 address. Indeed, whether there are millions of Iraqis courageous enough to consider themselves Iraqis first and Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shi’a, etc. second may well mean the difference between success and failure.
Yet many millions of Iraqis do, in fact, appear to persist in viewing the politics of the new Iraq primarily through an ethno-sectarian lens. The road ahead for all involved is likely to be fraught with difficulty. Judging by the course of events so far, prospects do not appear all that promising for the broad-based emergence of a truly “Iraqi” identity — be it opinion maker or the proverbial man in the street.
Iraqi political figures associated with the three post-Saddam governments have proclaimed time and time again the need for their countrymen to view themselves as Iraqis first and turn away from the politics of ethno-sectarian identity. Yet, there is considerable doubt about whether even these leaders are ready to “walk the walk” or merely “talk the talk.”
Some actions on the part of these leaders clearly benefit Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurds at the expense of Sunni Arabs. Whether or not such measures are just is beside the point. They will doubtless help foster inter-communal animosity and mistrust.
Consequently, the broader political process so far has been strewn with evidence that when the chips are down, ethno-sectarian instincts largely trump a broader sense of Iraqi identity. In the north, the Kurds demand the expulsion of tens of thousands of Sunni Arabs from Kirkuk, in what is clearly a zero-sum game. In Sunni Arab areas of the country, the vast majority voted against a constitution apparently viewed as enshrining Shi’a-Kurdish rule. And in both the north and the south, Kurds and Shi’a want to gain more exclusive access to the oil resources underneath them.
In a more ominous manifestation of things to come, Sunni Arab and Shi’a hit squads, the latter perhaps exploiting their new-found dominance over the Ministry of Interior and the police, reportedly have been carrying out extensive campaigns of assassination. Widespread acts of brutality on both sides, coupled with threats, are beginning to drive Sunnis out of Shi’a neighborhoods and vice-versa. It seems, along with events in Kirkuk, like the beginning of a process of ethno-sectarian cleansing.
Meanwhile, if that were not enough, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s open campaign of anti-Shi’a massacre by car-bomb is generating pressure for a more forceful Shi’a retaliation. Similarly, the failure of Coalition and Iraqi government forces to decisively gain the upper hand over largely Sunni Arab insurgents and terrorists has drawn some Kurdish and Shi’a militia elements into the ongoing battle. It has also raised interest in even more wholesale militia involvement.
President Bush speaks of the Iraqi yearning for freedom and democracy. But in a country so heavily scarred by inter-communal bloodshed - much of it long predating the 2003 war and its aftermath — too many Sunni Arabs seem thoroughly disinterested in democracy. Many view democracy merely as a form of government that would transfer power to the majority Shi’a community and its Kurdish allies. Sunnis fear they will use their new-found power in a variety of ways to administer a certain measure of payback,aimed largely at the Sunni Arab community that ruled the country for so long.
One litmus test of whether a true “Iraqi” identity can prevail will be the future of the Iraqi military. The debate focuses on differences in the quality and pace of training and equipping Iraqi forces as well as questions about their state of readiness. But ultimately, a greater question looms: will that army hold together in times of crisis as a symbol and tool that promotes unity?
The results of the US effort to build a multi-confessional Lebanese army in 1982 raise real concerns about what might happen to its growing Iraqi counterpart — and the country it represents. Large portions of Lebanon’s military transformed themselves fairly quickly into extensions of ethnic and religious factions that perpetuated Lebanon’s civil war.
In Iraq, the final verdict is not yet in. Nonetheless, there are tendencies in the composition and use of the army that raise serious questions, not only about its own fate, but that of the country it is meant to serve and unify.
Wayne White is an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute. Before his retirement in 2005, he served as Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s Near Eastern Division and coordinated Iraqi Intelligence for INR.