In mid-February, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah floated the idea that Arab states offer Israel full normalization of relations in return for an Israeli withdrawal from all territory occupied in the 1967 war.
Although Abdullah's land-for-peace formula is not new, the Saudi approach's novelty is in the fact that, rather than reiterating Arab grievances, it focuses up-front on the prize that awaits Israel if it trades land for peace. The Saudi peace plan is also significant because of its source: the de facto ruler of one of the wealthiest and most influential Arab states.
Although not a blueprint for Middle East peace, the Saudi plan provides a sound conceptual framework and, more importantly, promises a comprehensive and final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Saudi plan gained momentum rapidly as a result of the combination of escalating violence between Israelis and Palestinians and the lack of any other viable diplomatic initiative.
The prospects for real progress based on the Abdullah plan depend on whether it can achieve unified backing from the other Arab states. If the Saudi prince is confident of its warm acceptance, he will table the plan at the upcoming Arab League summit in Beirut. The biggest question mark in this regard is Syria. Of the Arab "frontline" states, Egypt and Jordan have already made their peace with Israel, and the Palestinian Authority has announced its support for the plan. Syrian President Bashar Assad, however, has yet to issue a formal statement on the proposal, and flies March 5th to Riyadh for consultations with Prince Abdullah on the issue.
What Will Determine Syria's Stance
Syria's attitude toward the Abdullah plan will be critical to the plan's future. On the one hand, the young Syrian leader believes that talk of normalization is a premature reward for Israel. Assad has strongly supported the intifada as a means of pressuring the Jewish state, and sees no reason to let up the pressure now. In that regard, Assad is concerned that the Saudi plan could become a lifeline for Sharon, now under fire at home for failing to end the uprising, ensure security for Israel or bring peace.
Moreover, Prince Abdullah's plan in its current form makes no mention of the Palestinian refugees, an issue of critical political and demographic importance to both Syria and Lebanon. In a visit to Lebanon over the weekend, Assad issued a joint statement with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud declaring that "there could be no compromise on the right of return for Palestinian refugees. The Abdullah plan will have to grapple with this difficult issue to be viable; yet an inadequate Saudi response to the refugee issue will likely torpedo any chances for unified Arab support for the plan at the Beirut summit.
On the other hand, Assad's real concern with any peace initiative is to protect Syria's own interests, especially on the Golan Heights. Bashar's father, the late Hafez Assad, supported the land-for-peace equation of the Madrid peace process, and later (at the Shepherdstown talks) accepted the principle of normalizing relations with Israel as part of an overall settlement of the Syrian-Israeli dispute. In that vein, if Bashar Assad gains assurances from the Saudi leadership that the plan entails Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the June 4 lines of 1967, Assad is unlikely to reject the proposal. In this case, Saudi Arabia will submit the idea for discussion during the Arab summit.
If the Abdullah Plan Succeeds: The Spotlight Turns to Israel
Should the Arab states join forces behind Prince Abdullah's proposal, the pressure on Israel for a positive response to the plan will be immense. Confronting unrelenting violence in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel, the United States has seized on the plan as a way of creating momentum for a cease-fire.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon sees a total Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines as counter to Israel's interest, arguing that Israel's borders would not be defensible without designating parts of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip as security zones. While withholding a final rejection, the Israeli government has already cited two reservations regarding the proposal. First, the 17-month-old Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation must come to an end before the proposal could be considered. Second, the Saudi plan would not be acceptable to Israel if it omitted recognizing Israel's right to live within "secure and recognized" borders, a key element of earlier UN resolutions on peacemaking.
But the success of the Saudi plan is not wholly dependent on Sharon. Indeed, unified Arab support for the plan could create a new sense among Israelis that there is "someone to talk to" on the Arab side. This might give the Israeli body politic, reeling from the escalating violence that was prompted by Sharon's get-tough policy, the incentive to bring down the Sharon government and elect a government more inclined to negotiations.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, the ball is in the Arab court: If Arab leaders demonstrate a unity of purpose and support the Saudi plan, it will have seized the initiative in the Arab-Israeli conflict for the first time in decades, and placed the burden for reciprocal gestures squarely on Israel. With no other viable plan on the table, Washington is likely to pursue this avenue and pressure Israel to resume negotiations with its Arab neighbors (including the PA) based on its total withdrawal from occupied territories. On the other hand, if the leaders of major Arab countries turn down or amend the Saudi plan in ways that provide Israel with an opening to reject it, the plan will be doomed. In sum, Arab disunity at the summit will let Israel off the hook.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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In mid-February, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah floated the idea that Arab states offer Israel full normalization of relations in return for an Israeli withdrawal from all territory occupied in the 1967 war.
Although Abdullah's land-for-peace formula is not new, the Saudi approach's novelty is in the fact that, rather than reiterating Arab grievances, it focuses up-front on the prize that awaits Israel if it trades land for peace. The Saudi peace plan is also significant because of its source: the de facto ruler of one of the wealthiest and most influential Arab states.
Although not a blueprint for Middle East peace, the Saudi plan provides a sound conceptual framework and, more importantly, promises a comprehensive and final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Saudi plan gained momentum rapidly as a result of the combination of escalating violence between Israelis and Palestinians and the lack of any other viable diplomatic initiative.
The prospects for real progress based on the Abdullah plan depend on whether it can achieve unified backing from the other Arab states. If the Saudi prince is confident of its warm acceptance, he will table the plan at the upcoming Arab League summit in Beirut. The biggest question mark in this regard is Syria. Of the Arab "frontline" states, Egypt and Jordan have already made their peace with Israel, and the Palestinian Authority has announced its support for the plan. Syrian President Bashar Assad, however, has yet to issue a formal statement on the proposal, and flies March 5th to Riyadh for consultations with Prince Abdullah on the issue.
What Will Determine Syria's Stance
Syria's attitude toward the Abdullah plan will be critical to the plan's future. On the one hand, the young Syrian leader believes that talk of normalization is a premature reward for Israel. Assad has strongly supported the intifada as a means of pressuring the Jewish state, and sees no reason to let up the pressure now. In that regard, Assad is concerned that the Saudi plan could become a lifeline for Sharon, now under fire at home for failing to end the uprising, ensure security for Israel or bring peace.
Moreover, Prince Abdullah's plan in its current form makes no mention of the Palestinian refugees, an issue of critical political and demographic importance to both Syria and Lebanon. In a visit to Lebanon over the weekend, Assad issued a joint statement with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud declaring that "there could be no compromise on the right of return for Palestinian refugees. The Abdullah plan will have to grapple with this difficult issue to be viable; yet an inadequate Saudi response to the refugee issue will likely torpedo any chances for unified Arab support for the plan at the Beirut summit.
On the other hand, Assad's real concern with any peace initiative is to protect Syria's own interests, especially on the Golan Heights. Bashar's father, the late Hafez Assad, supported the land-for-peace equation of the Madrid peace process, and later (at the Shepherdstown talks) accepted the principle of normalizing relations with Israel as part of an overall settlement of the Syrian-Israeli dispute. In that vein, if Bashar Assad gains assurances from the Saudi leadership that the plan entails Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the June 4 lines of 1967, Assad is unlikely to reject the proposal. In this case, Saudi Arabia will submit the idea for discussion during the Arab summit.
If the Abdullah Plan Succeeds: The Spotlight Turns to Israel
Should the Arab states join forces behind Prince Abdullah's proposal, the pressure on Israel for a positive response to the plan will be immense. Confronting unrelenting violence in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel, the United States has seized on the plan as a way of creating momentum for a cease-fire.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon sees a total Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines as counter to Israel's interest, arguing that Israel's borders would not be defensible without designating parts of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip as security zones. While withholding a final rejection, the Israeli government has already cited two reservations regarding the proposal. First, the 17-month-old Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation must come to an end before the proposal could be considered. Second, the Saudi plan would not be acceptable to Israel if it omitted recognizing Israel's right to live within "secure and recognized" borders, a key element of earlier UN resolutions on peacemaking.
But the success of the Saudi plan is not wholly dependent on Sharon. Indeed, unified Arab support for the plan could create a new sense among Israelis that there is "someone to talk to" on the Arab side. This might give the Israeli body politic, reeling from the escalating violence that was prompted by Sharon's get-tough policy, the incentive to bring down the Sharon government and elect a government more inclined to negotiations.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, the ball is in the Arab court: If Arab leaders demonstrate a unity of purpose and support the Saudi plan, it will have seized the initiative in the Arab-Israeli conflict for the first time in decades, and placed the burden for reciprocal gestures squarely on Israel. With no other viable plan on the table, Washington is likely to pursue this avenue and pressure Israel to resume negotiations with its Arab neighbors (including the PA) based on its total withdrawal from occupied territories. On the other hand, if the leaders of major Arab countries turn down or amend the Saudi plan in ways that provide Israel with an opening to reject it, the plan will be doomed. In sum, Arab disunity at the summit will let Israel off the hook.