With the election of the Justice and Development (AK) Party in 2002, the role of Islam in Turkish politics became questioned once again. Rusen Cakir, a senior correspondent for the Vatan Daily, concluded that the AK Party has radically separated itself from the Islamist ideology that represented previous Islamist parties. In doing so, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the AK Party have adapted to political realities of secularist Turkey and depicted themselves as conservative democrats.
The role of Islam in Turkish politics, a topic of concern since the early days of the Republic, has evolved over the past two decades. Rusen Cakir believes that the AK Party represents a radical shift away from traditional Islamist political ideology.
During the 1950s, the Islamist movement began to grow as a potent political force through the establishment of an Islamic-based political party. Clashes with secularist institutions, particularly the military, resulted in the Islamist parties being banned from political participation. Islamist political participation, however, continued to grow, and new parties formed to replace banned predecessors. Following the 1980 military coup, Necemettin Erbakan established the Welfare Party. By the 1990s, the Welfare party had gained sufficient electoral support needed to establish a coalition government and elevate Erbakan to the office of Prime Minister.
Within the Welfare Party, Cakir identified two main ideological currents: a traditionalist view, advocated by Erbakan, and a modernist view, which was championed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the mayor of Istanbul. Traditionalists used Islamic institutions and Islam in general to form their core support. Modernists, however, actively sought to incorporate those previously on the periphery, particularly women, youth, and the unemployed, into their political base. Modernist Welfare members were not less religious than traditionalists—to the contrary, modernists were more influenced by other Islamist movements in the region.
Following the “postmodern coup d’etat” in 1997 that resulted in the removal and banning of the Welfare Party, the modernist faction began to redefine itself in order to become compatible with the realities of a secular political system. Erdogan and other younger members of the Welfare Party began to criticize openly the party's past, and depicted themselves as conservative instead of Islamist. To build support for their new approach, Erdogan sought legitimacy for the new movement abroad. In the years following Welfare’s demise, Erdogan and others traveled throughout the United States and Europe meeting with diplomats, government officials, and others with interests in the region.
Departing from the position held by the Welfare Party, Erdogan championed Turkey’s movement toward membership in the European Union and actively sought to strengthen political and economic ties with the United States and Europe. Cakir believes that Erdogan’s European overtures, which occurred at a time when the West was aware of the eventual collapse of the fragile coalition government formed in 1999, allowed Erdogan and other modernists to achieve the legitimacy necessary to form their own political party, the AK Party.
Once in power, the AK Party positioned themselves as “conservative democrats,” although Cakir contended that the party had no other feasible option within the current secularist political system. Determined to avoid the fate of its Islamist predecessors, the AK Party has depicted itself as a national party not based solely on regional, ethnic, or religious support. Erdogan, as Prime Minister, has been a vocal champion of both Turkey’s accession into the EU and domestic reforms, and according to Cakir the AK Party has been far more progressive on these issues than other Turkish parties.
Until now, however, Erdogan and the AK Party have largely ignored problems related to Turkish secularism. To illustrate this, Cakir examined the headscarf debate, which stems from a longstanding ban on women being allowed to wear head scarves in public buildings. Many within AK’s base, particularly devout Muslim women, strongly support removing the ban, but Erdogan and other AK Party leaders have hitherto refused to address this issue. To the contrary, Erdogan has publicly stated that resolution of the headscarf debate is not his main agenda. Cakir believes that the AK Party has been very sensible in bypassing sensitive issues related to secularism, which has allowed the party to focus on the EU question and related reforms.
Rusen Cakir is a senior correspondent at the Turkish Vatan Daily. In addition, Cakir is the Program Coordinator on Democracy, Civil Society, and the Muslim World for TESEV, a leading independent think tank based in Istanbul, and an accomplished author on the Islamist movement and Turkish politics.
Mike Jackson, a graduate of the George Washington University and an intern in the Development Department, wrote this event summary.